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Abstract
Entitlement conditions are a little explored dimension of unemployment insurance
(UI) schemes. In this paper, we provide a comprehensive evaluation of a reform
that softened the minimum employment record condition to qualify for UI benefits
in France after 2009. Using administrative panel data matching employment and
unemployment spells, we first provide clear evidence that the reform induced a
separation response at the eligibility threshold. It appears both at the micro level
– through a jump in transitions from employment to unemployment – and at the
macro level – through the scheduling of shorter contracts, in line with the new eli-
gibility requirements. Exploiting the reform as well as relevant sample restrictions,
we then estimate the effects of receiving UI benefits on subsequent labour market
outcomes using a regression discontinuity design. Our findings point to a large
negative impact of UI benefits receipt on employment probability up to 21 months
after meeting the eligibility criterion, which is not counterbalanced by an increase
in job quality.
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Introduction
Unemployment insurance (UI) schemes are often compared across countries and over
time in terms of level of benefits or coverage duration. A less explored dimension – also
less quantifiable – is the ease of access to those schemes. UI schemes are characterised by
rules determining eligibility to claim benefits, and obligations to keep on receiving them
once an entitlement is opened. The existing literature mostly focuses on this second
aspect and finds that monitoring and sanctions have a positive effect on the number of
days employed (Fredriksson and Holmlund, 2001; Van den Berg et al., 2004; Lalive et
al., 2005; McVicar, 2008). By contrast, eligibility conditions to receive UI benefits have
attracted much less attention, although they are at the core of the insurance dimension
of unemployment schemes. These conditions determine how much individuals should
have contributed to the funding of the scheme through a minimum employment record
to be entitled to claim benefits. As highlighted by the construction of an indicator
of the strictness of eligibility criterion by the OECD, they vary a lot across countries
(Venn, 2012).1 As such, they have been heavily discussed in the policy debate over recent
years.Yet, evidence on their effects is still scarce.
This paper precisely evaluates the impact of the minimum employment record re-
quirement on transitions both in and out of employment. It takes advantage of a French
reform that softened this requirement, moving the work history threshold from 6 months
over the past 22 months to 4 months over the past 28 months in April, 2009. Exploit-
ing administrative data linking a matched employer-employee dataset to UI data for a
nationally-representative panel of individuals2 between 2003 and 2012, we are able to fol-
low individuals over their employment and unemployment spells and to precisely measure
the transitions and characteristics associated to each spell.
Like in most OECD countries, eligibility conditions are defined in a binary way in
France: workers experience a jump in the level of benefits when they reach the threshold,
1This indicator is made up of several items, including the minimum employment record as well
as job-search and availability requirements, monitoring and sanctions. The item related to minimum
employment record weights for 1/8 of the total index.
2The panel includes workers born in October of each year.
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going from zero to the maximum amount they could be entitled to given the level of
their past earnings.3 This discontinuity in the outside option of workers may not only
influence their labour supply decision but may also be internalised by employers, who
may align work contracts duration with the minimum record employment conditions. In-
deed, employers may rely on UI to provide a replacement income to workers between two
contracts when activity slows down, all the more so if they know eligibility conditions are
little restrictive.
In this paper, we first measure a separation response to the eligibility condition: the
transition rate from employment to registered unemployment increases from almost 0 to
1% at the threshold. We interpret our findings as being driven both by more individuals
separating from their job and claiming UI benefits when crossing the threshold, and by
more individuals remaining unemployed conditional on having a job separation. Focusing
on the subsample of individuals working full-time, for which we have a better precision
in the measure of work history, we further show that the reform induced a jump in the
biweekly transition rate from employment to non-employment from 7% to 10% at the
threshold for these workers.
We then investigate whether the increase in separation rates induced by the reform
translates into an effect on the structure of contract duration at the aggregate level. We
show that the number of fixed-term 4-month contracts relatively to fixed-term 6-month
contracts increased by about 30% (i.e. about 1.5 contract per month within firm) after
the reform. This marked increase is more specifically concentrated in sectors previously
identified as frequently hiring on very short-term contracts and with a high separation
rate.4 These trends suggest that the 4-month contract tend to become a new norm after
the reform. As a consequence, our results point to an impact of UI not only on job-
seekers’ pre and post-unemployment outcomes, but also on outcomes of workers who
do not experience unemployment. These effects are consistent with Müller et al. (2018)
who show, in the German context, that such norms can act as a constraint on the free
3Put differently, the level of benefits does not increase with work history once the threshold is reached.
4Decree No. 2019-797 of 26 July 2019 on the unemployment insurance scheme, DARES (2018).
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adjustment of labour supply for people who would like to work a different number of
hours than what is offered by firms. Similarly, a new norm on the duration of short
contracts could restrain the labour supply of workers in some sectors, including those not
seeking UI eligibility.
Finally, we investigate whether receiving UI benefits because of the reform has an
impact on individuals’ subsequent labour market outcomes. The 2009 reform changed
the composition of the pool of benefits claimants, giving the possibility to receive benefits
from the 4th month of employment, and extending the base reference period. This could
have an impact on the labour market outcomes of these workers who were not eligible
to UI benefits and had no substitution income in case of no employment before the
reform, and who were able to open a UI entitlement after the reform. In the absence of
any insurance, individuals are expected to take a job quickly, which doesn’t necessarily
match with their skills or which is of low quality. We therefore ask whether being covered
by UI has an impact on the probability to find a job, and on the characteristics associated
to this job.
Using a regression discontinuity design, we show that claiming benefits is associated
with a reduction in the probability to find a job at different time horizons, without any
clear positive impact on the subsequent job quality. The negative effect on employment
is still observed more than one year and a half after the end of the contract that made
workers reach the eligibility threshold. We also document a negative impact on daily
wages, more pronounced in the mid to long-term. Because of the employment response,
it is difficult to disentangle the negative impact on earnings due to a reduction in the
probability of employment from an increase in the probability to have lower paid jobs,
conditional on being employed. However, complementary results suggest that there is
no significant increase in several dimensions of job quality that may counterbalance this
negative impact on employment.
These results bring two main contributions to the literature. First, although the im-
pact of UI parameters on the behaviour of the unemployed has been extensively studied
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in the literature (see Schmieder and Von Wachter (2016) for a review),5 the potential
impact of UI on behaviours of employed workers and of employers is usually not incor-
porated in the optimal UI framework. While some theoretical mechanisms have already
been highlighted (Feldstein, 1976; Baily, 1977; Ortega and Rioux, 2010; Zhang and Faig,
2012; Pan and Zhang, 2012; Andersen et al., 2015; Hopenhayn and Nicolini, 2009), the
empirical literature on this topic remains scarce, quite old and usually based on survey
data.6 In particular, this aspect has never been studied in France, whereas it is likely to
be highly influenced by the institutional context.7 The first contribution of this paper is
therefore to shed light on a little studied question, looking at how UI can affect transi-
tions out of employment and influence separation decisions in the country. We also go
further by analysing the consequences of this separation response at the aggregate level,
providing suggestive evidence that the overall duration of work contracts responds to UI
incentives.
Our second contribution speaks to the much larger literature on UI benefits and
unemployment duration. It is now a well-known empirical fact that the duration of un-
employment is positively affected by the level of UI benefits (Chetty, 2008; Landais, 2015;
Lalive et al., 2006). However, the extensive margin effect of UI benefits on unemployment
duration - i.e. the effect of having some benefits as opposed to no benefit at all - has
been much less documented. One of the reason for this lack of evidence is that papers
looking at this margin have essentially focused on the response in terms of exit from em-
ployment (Martins, 2016; Rebollo-Sanz, 2012; Albanese et al., 2019). It is this response
that precisely makes the analysis of the consequences in terms of future employment
prospects difficult. In particular, quasi-experimental methods become hardly usable as
5Many papers have highlighted the impact of UI generosity and potential benefit duration on un-
employment duration (Lalive et al., 2006; Lalive, 2007; Landais, 2015) or reservation wages (Feldstein
and Poterba, 1984; Krueger and Mueller, 2016; Le Barbanchon et al., 2017) although the last two papers
cannot reject the null hypothesis of a zero effect.
6See Baker and Rea Jr (1998); Green and Riddell (1997); Christofides and McKenna (1995) for
example, with the exception of Martins (2016); Rebollo-Sanz (2012); Albanese et al. (2019); Van Doornik
et al. (2018); Jäger et al. (2019); Baguelin and Remillon (2014). The first four papers focus on the impact
of the UI eligibility criterion on flows to unemployment, and show that they are strategically timed to
coincide with UI eligibility. The last two papers focus on the population of older-workers. They document
that the last exit from employment is scheduled according to UI as a bridge to early retirement, and
that it responds to changes in the potential benefit duration.
7For instance, the effect is likely to differ according to the presence or not of experience rating.
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the endogenous employment response entails sorting at the eligibility threshold. A no-
table exception is Davezies and Le Barbanchon (2017), who analyse the consequences
of receiving UI benefits in terms of match quality in France, as an application of the
method they develop to correct for measurement error. We add to this previous analysis
in two ways: (i) we are able to get rid of the endogenous employment response issue by
taking advantage of the 2009 reform and making useful sample restrictions; (ii) we look
at a wider range of outcomes to draw a more complete picture of the effect of receiving
UI benefits. In particular, our work relates to the empirical debate on the effect of UI
benefits on job quality.8 Looking only at the probability of employment could be mis-
leading, as UI benefits could affect other dimensions of labour market outcomes. Being
able to measure the impact on job quality is therefore crucial to better assess the welfare
impact of UI benefits. Finally, another advantage of our setup it that we can combine
the analysis of UI benefits eligibility criterion on both the transitions in and out of em-
ployment. It allows a comprehensive evaluation of the 2009 reform. One drawback of
this exhaustiveness is that, although we find meaningful results on many dimensions, we
are under-powered on some aspects related to job quality. Further analysis on this topic
is left for future research.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section I and II describe the in-
stitutional background and the data. The following two sections provide evidence of a
separation response at the micro level (Section III), translating into a contract duration
response at the aggregate level (Section IV). Section V presents the methodology and the
results of the regression discontinuity design, and Section VI concludes.
8Whereas the standard job search model predicts a positive impact of UI benefits on future job qual-
ity, through higher reservation wages, the effect becomes ambiguous when negative duration dependence
is accounted for (Nekoei and Weber, 2017) Empirically, Nekoei and Weber (2017) find a positive effect,
whereas Schmieder et al. (2016) find a negative effect and Card et al. (2007); Lalive (2007); Van Ours
and Vodopivec (2008) a non-significant one. Focusing on the reservation wage channel in France, Le Bar-
banchon et al. (2017) find a precisely estimated zero elasticity of reservation wages with respect to the
level of UI benefits.
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1 Institutional background
As in many developed countries, UI is made of two components in France: an insurance
part and a solidarity part. What characterises the insurance part is a strong contributory
link. It means that what is paid to the claimants is tightly linked to their contribution
to the scheme. This general principle translates into different rules: (i) the amount
of benefits and social security contributions are proportional to past earnings; (ii) the
potential benefit duration (PBD) is proportional to work history; (iii) the main eligibility
criterion also depends on a minimum employment record.
This paper focuses on the third rule in order to study the extensive margin impact
of UI benefits on different labour market outcomes. We take advantage of a reform
implemented in April 20099 that changed the minimum work history condition from 6
months over the last 22 months to 4 months over the last 28 months. The pre-reform
period was characterised by different paths that linked a work history duration to a
PBD. For example, the pre-reform minimum working condition was requiring individuals
to have worked at least 6 months over the last 22 months and was giving them right to
7 months of potential benefit duration. A simpler rule was introduced by the reform,
leading to a one-to-one relationship between the number of days worked over the last 28
months and the PBD. After the reform, the minimum work history to be eligible is equal
to 4 months, and the PBD cannot exceed 2 years even when work history is longer.10
Our main empirical strategy exploits both the existence of a work history threshold in
the post-reform period and the evolution of this threshold over time due to the reform.
The other main features of the UI system have not been affected by the reform.
To receive benefits, unemployed workers have to fulfill the following requirements: (i)
be younger than the compulsory retirement age; (ii) live on the territory where the
unemployment insurance is applicable; (iii) be physically able to work; (iv) the job loss
must be involuntary;11 (v) be actively looking for a job and be available to work. Once
9cf. Arrêté du 30 mars 2009 portant agrément de la convention du 19 février 2009 relative à
l’indemnisation du chômage et de son règlement général annexé (Decree of March, 30th, 2009).
10For workers of 50 years old or more, the maximum PBD is equal to 3 years.
11Some exceptional cases of resignation open entitlements to UI, but they are very marginal.
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eligible, workers are entitled to claim benefits equal to a proportion of their past earnings.
The replacement rate is a decreasing function of the level of previous wage and can vary
from 57.4% to 75%. The level of benefits stays stable along the unemployment spell.
Once unemployed workers run out of benefits or if they are not eligible to UI benefits,
they may receive solidarity benefits or the minimum income.
2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Our main data source is administrative data that links a matched employer-employee
dataset (called DADS hereafter) to UI data (FH). The matched dataset is referred to as
the FH-DADS. The first dataset comes from employer records filled by firms each year
on each of their employees and that are used to compute social security contributions. It
contains detailed information on earnings, number of days worked, type of job, firm size,
industry, occupation. Most importantly, it includes identifiers for both the individual and
the employing firm. The second dataset comes from the French Unemployment Agency
(Pôle Emploi) and gathers information on individuals’ level and duration of benefits for
each unemployment spell and on their work history. It also provides some details on
their last work contract (firm size, industry, type of contract, separation motive, tenure,
etc.). These two datasets have been matched together for a subsample of the French
population (1/12th) from 2003 to 2012, resulting in an individual panel which allows us
to track individual career path and transitions from employment to unemployment.
Two main caveats of this dataset should be mentioned. First, the DADS does not
contain information on the exit motive, preventing us from distinguishing layoffs from
resignations. This information is present in the UI data, but it is then not available
for those separating and not registering to UI.12 Second, the unit of observation in the
DADS is defined at the firm × individual × year level. It means that if an individual has
several contracts within the same firm the same year, they will be gathered into the same
observation. In the remainder of the paper, we will call this unit of observation a position.
12As previously mentioned, most individuals who resign from a working contract are not eligible to
UI benefits and therefore do not register to UI.
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The starting date and ending dates will correspond to the first entry in the firm and the
last exit from the firm within a year, meaning that the individual is not necessarily
continuously employed in the firm in between. This could lead to an overestimation of
the contract duration, and in particular of the number of one-year contracts, as positions
starting and ending dates are often recorded as January, 1st and December, 31st even
when the actual contracts did not last 1 year.13 As a result, we may potentially end up
with measurement error when computing work history, in particular for workers often
working under short-term contracts and being recalled by former employers. For the
subsample for which we have the information in both datasets (for workers registering as
unemployed), we can cross-check the variable we compute using the DADS with the one
from the UI agency. We get approximately a 75% match rate if we take a rather slack
definition of a match.14
The first part of the analysis investigates how employers and employees react to the
change in the unemployment value at the eligibility cutoff by looking at the transitions
out of employment. We first remove from our sample people who experienced particular
forms of employment and are subject to different rules in terms of UI, such as home
employees for private employers or public sector workers. Our broad sample includes
2,690,114 individuals accounting for 18,114,742 positions ending between 2004 and 2012
and 3,071,283 corresponding unemployment spells. Depending on the analysis we per-
form, we further restrict the sample, as detailed in each section.
We exploit a second database to analyse the aggregate response to the change in
eligibility criterion in terms of contract duration (Section 4). This database is called the
MMO15 and is provided by the French Ministry of Labour. This is a repeated cross-
section, but the measure of the aggregate response does not require a panel structure.
13It may be the case because it corresponds to the first day of the first contract and the last day of
the last one within the same firm or because it has not been properly filled by the employer as it does
not have any consequences for the payment of contributions.
14More precisely, we define the two values as matching when they are equal ± 30 days, as there is
also a difference in way of counting days in the two bases that could lead to a small mismatch without
implying any measurement error.
15The MMO comes from a monthly return filled by any employer from the private and public sector,
including the self-employed, the unions and the associations if they employ 50 workers or more. Firms
of less than 50 employees are surveyed. It informs on all hiring and separation flows.
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The MMO has the advantage to capture every job transition more accurately than the
DADS, as it provides information on ending and starting dates and on the separation
motive at the contract level. However, job-to-job transitions with the same employer
cannot be measured in the dataset: for instance, a fixed-term contract extended with
a new fixed-term contract or converted into a permanent one without any interruption
will appear in a single employment spell. Assuming that the conversion and renewal
behaviours stay unchanged before and after the reform, this limitation should not affect
our results. Gathering all contracts ending between 2005 and 2015, and disaggregating
by type of separation, we end up with the sample described in Table A1.
The different analyses developed in this paper, and especially the second part, focus on
a particular population of workers with short work history. Using the DADS, Tables A2 to
A4 show how their individual and job characteristics compare to workers on longer-term
contracts. Their short work history can be explained both by their shorter experience
and by their weaker attachment to the labour market, as indicated by a lower hourly
wage and by a lower chance to have a permanent contract or to work full-time. They
are also more frequently male, work in smaller plants, and have a higher probability of
holding multiple jobs at the same time.16 This last characteristic is consistent with their
higher share of temporary and part-time contracts. Furthermore, workers with short work
history are typically found in sectors such as the agriculture, food and accommodation,
administrative services, arts and entertainment, and much less in the manufacturing
or the construction sectors. This pattern coincides with the one underlined by studies
describing which sectors are frequently hiring workers under very short-term contracts
(DARES, 2019). In terms of types of occupations, workers with short work history are
more likely to be in a low-ranked occupation.
16When a person holds multiple jobs at the same time and looses one of them, she is entitled to
receive UI benefits as long as she fulfils the eligibility conditions. The benefits will be computed based
on this lost activity, and potentially previous ones that have been lost within the last twelve months.
The person can receive her benefits in addition to earnings from the other jobs she kept. In the event
that she loses one of her jobs again, the UI entitlement will be revised to take into account this new job
loss.
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3 Empirical evidence of a separation response
The eligibility criterion to UI benefits may influence the labour supply decision of
workers as it introduces a sharp discontinuity into the value of unemployment. Indeed,
when crossing the work history threshold, workers experience an increase in their outside
option value, as they will be entitled to receive a replacement income in case they stop
working.17 It may also affect labour demand if employers rely on the UI to provide
workers a replacement income in low phases of the cycle. The behavioural response we
want to measure is twofold: (i) we are first interested in knowing whether workers and/or
employers deliberately choose to schedule the end of contracts so that it coincides with
workers’ eligibility; (ii) but we also study whether, conditional on the contract ending,
workers choose to stay unemployed once eligible while, absent the UI, they would take
another job.
The first step of our analysis consists in studying the distribution of the probability
to transit from employment to unemployment with respect to previous work history.
Figure 1 shows that, conditional on ending a contract, the probability to register for UI
jumps at the eligibility threshold. A spike can also be seen at 6 months that may be
due to regularity in contract duration, as 6 months is a reference point. However, we
do not observe any break in the trend, whereas we do observe a discontinuity during
the pre-reform period, when the eligibility criterion was at 6 months within the last 22
months (Figure 2). On the reverse, we do not observe any discontinuity in the probability
to transit from employment to unemployment at 4 months within the last 28 months
during the pre-reform period, or at 6 months within the last 22 months during the post-
reform period (Figures A1 and A2). It indicates that discontinuities observed at eligibility
thresholds in Figures 1 and 2 cannot be explained by those thresholds being reference
points for reasons outside UI eligibility.
To complete the analysis, we also investigate whether the probability to end a contract
is affected by the eligibility criterion. To do so, we turn to the measure of the biweekly
17Provided that they meet the other eligibility criteria, and especially the one specifying that the job
loss must be involuntary.
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transition from employment to registered unemployment (as defined as being registered
to UI) and from employment to a broader definition of non-employment that includes not
working and not being registered for UI. We convert our data defined at the position level
into a dataset where each observation represents two weeks of each worker’s career path,
with information on the type and date of transition, and the work history at the end of
the two weeks. For our main period of interest, the starting point is defined at the worker
level as the first contract starting after the reform. We define four types of transitions
which may happen at a biweekly rate: (1) from employment to employment; (2) from
employment to registered unemployment; (2’) from employment to non-employment; (3)
from non-employment to employment.18 We then examine whether the transition rate
jumps at particular values, on the sample of 864,534 individuals that we observe from their
first contract after the reform up to two years after. Figure 3 shows a clear jump in the
probability of transiting from employment to unemployment at the eligibility threshold.
In line with this result, Table 1 shows that having a work history right above the eligibility
threshold is associated to a 0.8 percentage point increase in the probability to transit from
employment to registered unemployment, from an almost 0 probability at the left-hand
side of the cutoff.19 However, we do not observe such a pattern if we look at the transitions
from employment to non-employment (Figure 4).
Taken together with Figures 1 and 2 and Figures A1 and A2, these findings are com-
patible with two interpretations. First, a separation response of both (or either) workers
and employers could drive the results. However, at that stage, we cannot exclude that our
findings are fully mechanical. Non-employed individuals with an affiliation lying between
4 and 6 months could simply take advantage of their new right without any other change
in the behaviour of economic agents. In other words, substitution from non-registered
18Note that (2) is included in (2’).
19The low transition rate in absolute terms is explained by the fact that we only analyse the opening of
new UI rights. We do so because, if a unemployed individual finds a job before the end of her entitlement
and then returns to unemployment, she can either resume her former right, open a new right based on
her very last employment spell, or take a mix of both rights. This means that she doesn’t need to fulfil
the minimum employment history condition again to be able to receive UI benefits as long as the former
right is not exhausted. That is the reason why we focus on the opening of new UI rights to better capture
the effect of the eligibility criterion. We then only measure a subsample of all transitions to registered
UI.
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non-employment to registered unemployment could rationalise our findings.
We still have several reasons to think that the jump in the transition rate from em-
ployment to registered unemployment partly arises from the separation response due to
UI eligibility. First, the literature suggests that a response to UI incentives in terms of
transition from employment to non-employment is a likely phenomenon. Thus, evidence
from other countries (Rebollo-Sanz (2012) in Spain and Albanese et al. (2019) in Italy)
point to a significant separation response at the eligibility thresholds in comparable insti-
tutional settings.20 In the French context, Khoury (2019) highlights strategic separation
scheduling in the case of economic layoffs to qualify workers for higher UI benefits.
Second, several elements could blur our previous result on the transition from em-
ployment to non-employment. Transitions to UI are a small share of total transitions to
non-employment. As a result, the effect may be attenuated when we pool together all
transitions out of employment. Further, the measurement error in the computation of
work history mentioned in section 2 might affect the precision of the results and hide the
discontinuity. To overcome this issue, we focus on workers whose number of hours worked
during the position corresponds to the number of hours worked for a person employed full-
time all the days covered by the position. This restriction alleviates measurement issues
by ensuring that the position corresponds to one single contract.21 Figure 5 shows that
there is a clear discontinuity in the transition rate from employment to non-employment
at the eligibility threshold, confirming that part of the difference in pattern between
transition rate to registered unemployment and non-employment may be due to precision
issues. This is confirmed by Table 2 which measures, in a regression discontinuity design
spirit, the discontinuity in the transition rate at the threshold on this specific sample. Ac-
cording to this regression, the transition rate increases by about three percentage points
at the cutoff, which represents a 43% increase relative to the rate right below the cutoff.
20Both Rebollo-Sanz (2012) and Albanese et al. (2019) can make the distinction between quits and
layoffs. They show that there is a jump in the hazard rate out of employment when looking at layoffs,
but not when looking at quits.
21One drawback of this restriction is that we focus on a population of individuals working full-time,
which may not be the population reacting the most to incentives to exit employment.
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Overall, Tables 1 and 2 and Figures 1, 3 and 5 are therefore hinting at a response
from firms and workers to the increase in the value of unemployment through separation
at the eligibility threshold. As most of the resignations do not allow workers to claim UI
benefits, it implies that employers do contribute to this separation response.
4 Impact of UI eligibility criterion on contract dura-
tion
The analysis developed in Section 3 indicates that the change in the value of unem-
ployment at the eligibility threshold leads to a higher probability to transit to unemploy-
ment, especially registered unemployment, at the threshold. To be eligible, workers need
to prove that job loss was involuntary. It means that they are entitled to receive bene-
fits only after having been dismissed or laid-off, or having mutually agreed on contract
termination with their employer. Only few cases of resignation are considered legitimate
and open entitlements to UI.22 This rule implies that employers are instrumental in this
strategic job separation, by accepting to dismiss the worker, by mutually agreeing on
contract termination, or, more likely, by designing shorter work contracts.23
Indeed, the relaxation of the UI eligibility criterion introduced by the 2009 reform
may have influenced the duration of fixed-term contracts offered by employers, as they
may internalise the jump in the value of unemployment at the new eligibility threshold
at the moment of the hiring. The reform thus allows them to have more flexibility and to
commit on a shorter period, as they are able to offer 4-month contracts while guaranteeing
to the worker the maintenance of their income through UI benefits between two short
contracts.
The 2009 reform is concomitant with a sharp increase in the share of short-term
contracts in total hiring, and in the share of employees rehired by the same employer, as
depicted in Figure A3 in the appendix. Those two trends are compatible with employment
22To follow a spouse who has been transferred is one of them.
23Most of the entries to UI are through the end of fixed-term or temporary contracts (about 24%
between May 2016 and May 2017 for example, according to UI figures).
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relationships where employers would offer a contract just long enough so that workers
would be eligible to UI benefits at the end of the contract, then rely on UI to compensate
workers, and then potentially rehire them. This type of employment relationship has the
triple advantage to: (i) allow a more flexible adjustment of the workforce to the variation
of the firm activity with shorter commitment periods,24 as underlined in Christofides and
McKenna (1995); (ii) help employees accept shorter contracts as it is counterbalanced by
UI benefits and recall behaviour; (iii) allow employers to retain workers and to have them
investing in firm-specific human capital without bearing the cost of high employment
protection. Indeed, the share of recalled workers has increased along with the share of
short-term contracts in recent years (Benghalem, 2016; Journeau, 2019).
We therefore ask whether the change in eligibility criterion introduced by the 2009
reform contributed to the decrease in the duration of contracts offered by employers. To
do so, we analyse the evolution of contracts duration at the aggregate level, exploiting
administrative records that employers have to fill each quarter on inflows and outflows
from the firm. These records are gathered in the MMO (Mouvements de Main d’Oeuvre)
database, which provides information on the date and type of flows and on some charac-
teristics of the worker and the firm.
We first focus on fixed-term contracts and we perform a difference-in-difference es-
timation, comparing the evolution of the number of 4-month and 6-month contracts,
before and after the reform. To do so, we restrict our sample to 4-month and 6-month
fixed-term contracts and we aggregate all observations at the firm x month x contract
duration level.25 We then estimate the following equation:
Y dimt = α + β1.postmt + β2.1d=4 + β3.postmt ∗ 1d=4 + µi + κm + δt + imt (1)
where Y dimt is equal to the number of contracts of duration d ∈ {4; 6} ending in firm i,
on month m of year t. postmt is a dummy variable that equals 0 before the reform was
implemented in April 2009 and 1 for all subsequent periods, and 1d=4 is a dummy variable
24The commitment period here refers to the duration of the fixed-term contract. Although it is
possible to break a fixed-term contract before its end, it entails an economic and administrative cost.
25Contract duration is rounded to the nearest month.
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indicating 4-month contracts. The parameter of interest, β3, captures the evolution of the
average number of 4-month contracts ending every month in each firm before and after the
reform, relative to the evolution of 6-month contracts. We complete the model with the
full set of firm, month and year fixed effects.26 Results are displayed in Table 3. The fourth
specification, which includes firm, sector, year and month fixed-effects, indicates that
the reform of the UI eligibility criterion have induced 1.53 additional 4-month contracts
ending each month in a given firm as compared to 6-month contracts. It represents a
17.4% increase. When restricting to the sample of firms present in both periods and
having at least one 4-month and one 6-month contract ending during each period, the
increase is equivalent to 17.9% (see column 5).
This evidence is further confirmed by the estimation of a model in which we interact
the dummy variable for 4-month contracts in equation (1) with yearly dummies rather
than a pre-post variable. The resulting estimates are displayed in Figure 6. It depicts a
clear jump after the reform, with the number of 4-months contracts (relative to 6-months
contracts) remaining at higher levels on all subsequent years, whereas no significant dif-
ference is observed before the reform. The year after the reform, there are on average two
additional 4-months contracts ending every month in each firm as compared to the year
before, relative to the same evolution for 6-months contracts. Compared to a 4.8 average
number of 4-months contracts ending each month in each firm in 2008, this represents a
45% increase.27 Results outlined in Table 3 and Figure 6 indicate that employers sub-
stitute 6-month contracts with 4-month contracts when making their hiring decisions as
a response to the reform, suggesting that the 4-month contracts tends to become a new
norm among short-term contracts after the reform.
We push the analysis one step further by looking at the within-sector decomposition of
the change. Figure 7 shows the difference-in-difference estimate using the fourth specifi-
26We also include sector dummies to account for the very few cases of firms switching across sectors
over the period.
27However, we should keep in mind that the difference-in-difference coefficient measures the relative
increase of 4-month contracts, which may not be equivalent to the change in the number of 4-month
contracts in absolute terms.
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cation of Table 3 within each of the thirty-five sectors defined using a 2-digit classification.
We observe that about a third of them experience a significant increase in the relative
number of 4-month contracts after the reform. Those sectors are mainly sectors identified
as having a high separation rate,28 or having a high-share of very short contracts in total
hiring (DARES, 2018). Out of the thirteen sectors identified by the administration29 as
having a high separation rate or a high share of very short contracts, ten experience a
positive change in the number of 4-month contracts relative to 6-month contracts after
the reform. This picture suggests that employers in sectors that are used to repeatedly
hiring under very short contracts with a high turnover may be more aware of UI eligibility
rules and more willing to minimise contract duration and maximise flexibility.30 They
may then particularly react to a change in the eligibility criterion.
This evidence is further confirmed by a firm-level analysis, where we compute the
change in the number of 4-month contracts relative to 6-month contracts using the same
difference-in-difference approach within each firm. We keep only firms that are observed
in both periods and with at least one contract ending at four months and one ending at six
months before and after the reform. We then examine the distribution of sectors among
firms with a high difference-in-difference coefficient, defined as a coefficient above the 90th
percentile of the coefficient distribution. Table A5 compares the distribution of sectors
among these firms and all the other firms, while Figure A4 reports the difference in the
share of firms belonging to each sector between these two groups when this difference is
positive (i.e., for sectors that are over-represented among high-coefficient firms). Sectors
identified as having either a high separation rate or a high share of very short contracts
are again more likely to include firms with a high increase in 4-month contracts. This
is illustrated by the fact that most of the points on Figure A4 are red, i.e. most of the
over-represented sectors among firms with a high relative increase are sectors with a high
28The 2019 unemployment insurance reform in France introduced a contribution scheme similar to
experience rating, targeting seven sectors whose high turnover was making UI bear a substantial cost.
The criterion to identify those sectors is to have a separation rate higher than 150% (Decree No. 2019-797
of 26 July 2019 on the unemployment insurance scheme).
29We pool together sectors specified in DARES (2018) and in the Decree No. 2019-797 of 26 July
2019 on the unemployment insurance scheme.
30In particular, temporary employment agencies are included in these sectors characterised by a strong
positive response in the number of 4-month contracts.
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turnover, and that most of the red points are located where the difference is the highest.
It provides further evidence that some sectors are particularly reacting to the change in
the UI eligibility criterion.
Although we expect the response to be particularly high for fixed-term contracts, as
they represent the majority of the flows and the easiest way to adjust the workforce to
economic fluctuations, we also examine other types of contract separation. Overall, we
do not see any positive response in terms of economic layoffs or dismissals on personal
grounds (Figures A5 and A6 and Tables A6 and A7). However, if we focus on the sectors
where the separation rate and the share of very-short contracts are high, we also observe
a positive response, and especially for economic layoffs (Figures A7 and A8). Reassur-
ingly, we do not observe any similar pattern for voluntary resignation, as this motive does
not open entitlements to UI, and should not be influenced by UI eligibility rules (Fig-
ures A9 and A10). The evolution for other separation motives can be seen in Tables A8 to
A11. In particular, we observe a small positive response when looking at pre-retirement
separations. This is in line with previous findings (Baguelin and Remillon, 2014) high-
lighting a strategic scheduling of retirement and pre-retirement dates in order for workers
to be covered by UI first and then by pension schemes without any interruption in pay-
ment. Those motives may then be particularly sensitive to a change in UI eligibility rules.
In Table A12 and Figure A11, we corroborate previous findings using UI data pro-
viding information on the set of the last contracts used to open UI entitlements (that
are the contracts just preceding the UI spell). While the dataset does not represent the
universe of contracts, it has the advantage of being a panel and including work history
information. As it is UI data, one may be concerned about a potential increase in the
share of 4-month contracts being driven by the fact that 4-month contracts are sufficient
to open a UI entitlement after the reform whereas it was not the case before. This would
mechanically lead to less 4-month contracts being recorded before the reform. That is
why we exclude workers registering with a work history between 4 and 6 months, as they
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were invisible before the reform.31 Figure A11 depicts the yearly evolution of the share of
each type of contracts among contracts of 1 year or less, according to their ending date.32
The vertical line separates the pre and post-reform periods. While the trends are par-
allel during the pre-reform period, we observe that after the relaxation of the eligibility
criterion, the share of 4-month contract has dramatically increased whereas the share of
6-month contracts has slightly decreased.33 The response in terms of number of 4-month
contracts already measured in the MMO data seems to be exacerbated in the UI data.
It may be explained by the fact that (i) UI data includes information only on the last
employment spell used to open a UI entitlement, which may be particularly subject to
optimisation, and that (ii) sectors with a high turnover, where the response as measured
by the MMO is the highest, may be over-represented in UI data as they send a high share
of workers to UI.34
The fact that we observe this pattern even if we excluded workers with a work history
between 4 and 6 months suggests that the 4-month contract has become a new norm
after the reform, at least in some sectors familiar with short-term employment, no matter
if the worker is already eligible to UI or not. This means that UI design not only affects
employed workers who will experience unemployment, but it may also affect workers who
did not and will not experience unemployment, through a change in contract duration
practices.
5 Extensive margin effect of UI benefits
Although the effect of higher UI benefits on employment outcomes has been largely
documented, much less is known on the effect of UI at the extensive margin. Several
reasons can be put forward: (i) such an analysis requires to have data on employment
31Including them in the sample indeed yields higher estimates of the increase and decrease in 4 and
6-month contracts shares, respectively of +2ppts and -1.5ppts.
32The ending date of the contract is used to determine under which UI rules the worker falls.
33We also represent the share of 1-month and 10-month contracts as a way to control for the trend,
which may be particularly crucial at a time of economic crisis.
34In addition to this, when we decompose the change by separation motives, it provides us with a
similar picture as when using the MMO: the response is the highest for fixed-term contracts. These
graphs are available upon request.
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and unemployment spells of all workers, not only those registering to UI, to be able to
compare eligible and non eligible workers; (ii) the effect on transitions out of employment
highlighted in the Sections 3 and 4 can hinder the analysis of the effect of UI receipt
on future employment outcomes. Indeed, if the eligibility to UI benefits has an impact
on the probability to transit from employment to unemployment, it becomes difficult to
compare eligible to non eligible workers. For example, comparing workers at both sides
of the eligibility threshold in a regression discontinuity design spirit may lead to biased
results if there is sorting into unemployment on one side.
We work around this issue by using a reform in the eligibility criterion to UI benefits
that came into effect on April, 1st, 2009. The work history requirement has been relaxed
from 6 months over the last 22 months to 4 months over the last 28 months. We can
therefore compare people with work history between 4 and 6 months before and after
the reform, as, under some conditions, they would not react in terms of employment
exit in the close neighbourhood of the reform. This assumption is plausible if we make
the following restrictions: we select workers reaching 4 to 6 months of cumulative work
history at the end of the their contract (i) only if they have started their last contract
before the reform has passed and (ii) only if their last contract was a fixed-term contract.
Indeed, if there is a separation response after the reform has passed, it may be much
more limited for fixed-term contracts that have started before the reform, as it is quite
costly to separate ahead of the expected end of the contract. The separation response is
likely to go mainly through dismissals of workers under permanent contracts or design of
new shorter fixed-term contracts. Both channels are muted after the sample restrictions.
To be fully convinced that such restrictions of our sample ensures that no separation
response biases the analysis, we can check whether there was not a disproportionately
high number of fixed-term contracts of 4 months or less that have started before the
reform and have ended right after. Figures A12 to A16 depict that share of contracts (i)
having started before the reform; (ii) of a certain duration among contracts of 1 year and
less, according to their ending date. For 4-month contracts, for example (Figure A16),
we see that there is indeed an increase for contracts ending in April. However, this
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increase is likely to be driven by the high number of contracts starting on January, 1st,
and mechanically ending at the end of April.35 Indeed, we observe the same increase
for years different from the one of the reform, indicating that this pattern is driven by
seasonality.
We implement a fuzzy regression discontinuity design on this restricted sample. For
this part of the analysis, we gather into a single observation all the contracts that occurred
without any interruption for the same individual within the same establishment, so as to
be able to capture transitions from fixed-term to permanent contracts within the same
firm.36 We end up with a sample made of 23,559 observations. The treated group is
composed of workers having started a fixed-term contract before April, 1st, 2009 that
ended after the reform and made them reach a work history lying between 4 and 6
months. They are eligible to unemployment benefits. The control group is made of
workers reaching the same work history interval after a fixed-term contract ending before
the reform, and who are then not eligible to UI benefits. By construction, the ending
date of the contract cannot exceed 6 months after the reform. We then take a similar
6-month time window before the reform.
The idea is that people located very close to the time threshold are likely to be
similar, on average, in all respects but their eligibility status. Therefore, any systematic
difference in their outcomes can be imputed to the fact that some are eligible to, and
then may receive UI benefits. This “quasi experimental design” is closely related to a
local randomisation in the neighbourhood of the threshold as on which side any person
will be located can be considered random, as long as some assumptions are verified.
Table A13 provides some descriptive statistics on treated and control workers. Control
workers have, on average, a slightly higher daily wage, which seems almost entirely driven
by the fact that they work more frequently full-time. They also work in smaller establish-
ments. Differences are not big and only concern a few covariates, and thus do not seem
35This mechanism is also partly at play for contracts ending in May as we have selected the share of
contracts between 4 (included) and 5 (excluded) months.
36We do so to correct for the fact that, as the dataset is built on observations within a year, a contract
which duration is greater than 1 year is automatically split into two lines although it corresponds to a
continuous employment spell.
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to challenge the validity of the RDD. More importantly, we will check in next subsection
that these covariates do not differ discontinuously at the time threshold. Among treated
workers, takers and non-takers do not differ in terms of socio-demographic characteristics
(Table A14). Not surprisingly, takers have a higher wage and a higher work history,37
which is associated to a higher benefit and a longer potential benefit duration.
Empirical methodology – The equation we estimate is the following:
Y = α + τ1Z≥c + δff(Z) + δgg(Z)1Z≥c (2)
with Y being the outcome, such as the employment probability in this case, 1Z≥c an
indicator equal to 1 when the running variable – the ending date of the contract – is
greater or equal to c, the time cutoff, equal to April, 1st, 2009. f(.) and g(.) are flexible
functions that we allow to differ on each side of the cutoff. Recall that the variable
accounting for work history may suffer some measurement error because we compute it
from the DADS which is originally organised by positions. This is an issue to the extent
that it will undermine the precision of our estimation. However, it should not bias our
results as there is no reason why the measurement error should differ from one side of
the cutoff to the other, at the close neighbourhood of the threshold.
In this setting, the RD design is qualified as “fuzzy” in the sense that the probability
to receive UI benefits does not jump from 0 to 1 for workers with more than 4 months
of work history right after the reform. Indeed, having accumulated 4 months of work
history at the end of a contract does not mean the person will immediately open an
unemployment right as (i) she may very quickly transit to another job; (ii) she may not
be informed about her eligibility; (iii) she may be informed but not be willing to take her
benefits for many reasons, such as stigma for example.38
37By construction, both takers’ and non takers’ work history lies between 120 and 180 days.
38According to figures from UI in September 2016 (Insee, 2018), about 75% of individuals eligible to
UI benefits actually claim them.
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It follows that:
Pr(UI = 1∣Z = c − ) = 0 and Pr(UI = 1∣Z = c + ) < 1
with UI being a dummy indicating if the person receives UI benefits.
Imperfect takeup takes us away from the standard “sharp” RD design. Yet, the
identification remains possible as long as we have a jump in the probability of treatment
at the cutoff, though lower than one:
Pr(UI = 1∣Z = c − ) ≠ Pr(UI = 1∣Z = c + )
The “fuzzy” RDD exploits the discontinuity in the probability of treatment at the
threshold. The treatment effect can then be recovered by dividing the jump in the
relationship between the outcome and the ending date of the contract by the jump in the
relationship between the UI benefit receipt and the ending date of the contract at the
cutoff.
The estimand can be interpreted as a weighted local average treatment effect, as it
is computed on the population of compliers, where the weight represents the ex ante
probability of being around the threshold.
The identification rests upon two assumption: (i) monotonicity, i.e. the fact that
crossing the cutoff does not cause, at the same time, some units to be treated and others
to be excluded from treatment; (ii) excludability, i.e. the fact that crossing the cutoff
does not have an impact on Y other than through the receipt of UI benefits. If the first
assumption is verified by definition of the design of the UI eligibility rules, the second
assumption cannot be ultimately tested, but some elements make it more credible, that
will be further developed in the following paragraphs. Theoretically, if the window con-
sidered is not too large, there is no reason for ending the contract right before or right
after the April, 1st, 2009 cutoff to affect labour market outcomes other than through
the eligibility to UI benefits. To make this excludability assumption more plausible, 3
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types of tests are performed: (i) a check of the continuity of the running variable den-
sity at the cutoff to get rid of any manipulation suspicion; (ii) a check of the continuity
of observed baseline covariates at the cutoff to confirm the non selection and compara-
bility of populations at each side of the cutoff; (iii) a check of the existence of a jump
in the probability of being treated at the cutoff, a necessary first-stage to detect any effect.
Validity conditions of the RDD – One key assumption to check for the RDD to
be valid is that there is no manipulation at the threshold, or strategic sorting of worker at
either side of the threshold. If it was the case, we would have a selection bias that would
prevent us from comparing the populations at each side of the cutoff. In particular, we
want to check if there is no separation response to the eligibility that would make the den-
sity of contract terminations jump at the threshold. We perform a McCrary (2008) test
to check that the density of the contract ending date is smooth at the cutoff (Figure 8).
The density exhibits some spikes at each month interval – including at the cutoff – due to
the regularity in the starting and ending dates of the contract. However, the histogram
(Figure 9) indicates that the spike is of the same magnitude as for other months of the
year. We also perform the same Mc Crary test at the same time threshold one year be-
fore, that confirms that the spike is only due to regularity in contract dates (Figure 10).
These different tests demonstrate that there is no precise sorting at the threshold, and
that RDD can be considered “as good as randomization” in the neighbourhood of the
threshold.
First stage estimation – Equation 2 shows the reduced form of two equations
capturing the first stage relationship between the ending date of the contract and the
opening of a UI right (Eq. 3) and the second stage relationship between the opening of
a UI right and labour market outcomes (Eq. 4).
UI = αf + τf1Z≥c + βffff(Z) + βgfgf(Z)1Z≥c + µf (3)
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Y = αs + τsUI + βfsfs(Z) + βgsgs((Z)UI) + µs (4)
The estimate τs from the two stage least square corresponds to a local average treatment
effect.
Table 4 shows that being located at the right hand side of the cutoff makes the
probability of opening a UI right significantly increase, from 5.8 to 6.9 percentage points,
depending on the specification. Although the effect is not very strong, the estimate is
highly significant, and the jump in the probability is clear, as depicted on Figure 11.
The weak first-stage regression could raise some precision issues. Table 4 provides F-
statistics demonstrating the reliability of the first-stage estimation for all specifications.
As underlined in previous subsection, many reasons could explain an imperfect takeup
of UI rights, the main one being that there are many job-to-job transitions with small
interruptions in between. Therefore, people who know they will be employed again in
the very short-run will plausibly not undertake the administrative burden of registering
as unemployed.
To fully conclude that the difference in outcomes we observe between populations at
each side of the threshold can be imputed to the difference UI takeup, we need to rule
out the influence of other variables at the threshold. Figures A17 to A21 do not depict
any clear jump in the distribution of covariates at the threshold. The small decrease in
the proportion of full-time workers that we observe graphically does not translate into a
significant change in the regression, as confirmed by Table 5. Figure A22 shows graphi-
cally that the differences are not significant at the 5% level. As already underlined in the
analysis of the Mc Crary test, strategic sorting of people on either side of the threshold
is very unlikely as the eligibility requirements are closely checked by the unemployment
insurance.39
Second stage estimation – Empirically, we estimate Equation 2 using a local poly-
nomial regression. The bandwidth has been chosen using an optimal bandwidth selection
39In order to open a UI right, a worker must justify his work experience based on employers’ certificate
delivered at the end of each contract or on payslip.
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method minimising the mean squared error (Calonico et al., 2014, 2018a,b). The main
specification uses the local linear regression, but Tables A15 to A20 show the same regres-
sion using a quadratic specification. Results are quantitatively similar, but the higher-
order specification being more demanding in terms of number of observations, coefficients
are not always significant. Indeed, the sample restrictions that have been made to ensure
that the analysis will not be polluted by a separation response imply that the sample
size is smaller, and the coefficients less precisely estimated. However, the fact that the
coefficients are of the same magnitude is reassuring on the validity of the effect.
As for the main specification, Tables A21 to A26 show that there is a strong negative
response on employment probability even in the long-run (up to 21 months after contract
separation). Receiving UI benefits as opposed to not receiving any benefit at all is
predicted to decrease employment probability in the future to a large extent.40 Results
are surprising in the sense that we would expect a negative impact in the very short-run
and a positive one in the longer-run, as workers in the control group are incentivised
to accumulate work history to become eligible in the future. However, we observe that
coefficients are not significant in the first three months, and then become negative and
significant. A potential explanation is that the population of controls ending a contract
before the reform with a work history between 4 and 6 months may only need to work
a few hours or a few days after the reform to become eligible to UI benefits, as they
would have a work history between 4 and 6 months with their last contract ending after
the reform. This could explain why the very short-term effect is not negative. On the
other hand, because they need to work a positive number of hours or days to qualify
for UI benefits as compared to the treated, they would end up being eligible with a
longer average work history than the treated. This would entitle them to a longer benefit
duration. If we believe that a longer benefit duration is helpful in finding a more stable
job, it could explain that they are less unemployed on the longer-run. In any case, the
interpretation of the RDD estimate is not straightforward as it captures not only the
40Results are quantitatively difficult to interpret as coefficients are often greater than one whereas
the outcome variable is a probability. A bivariate probit model has been used as a complement to
accommodate the binary nature of the outcome variable. Results displayed in Tables A27 to A32 indicate
a 60 percentage points drop in the probability of being employed in the short-run.
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effect of being eligible to UI benefits, but also the effect, for control workers, of having
incentives to find a job quickly to increase work history.
Figure 12 illustrates the effect graphically on the probability to be employed 6 months
after the end of the contract determining the eligibility status. Similar graphs plotting the
probability to be unemployed and to be in the labour force can be found in Figures 13 and
14.41 They indicate that the lower employment probability of compliers transits through
a higher probability to be non-employed but not registered for UI.
Consistently, we find a positive impact of receiving UI benefits on the time to the
next employment spell, indicating that workers receiving UI benefits take more time to
find a new job (Table A33). This result is in line with what has been previously found on
the impact of UI benefits at the intensive margin on the unemployment duration (Card
and Levine, 2000; Chetty, 2008; Card et al., 2015; Kroft and Notowidigdo, 2016; Landais,
2015; Le Barbanchon, 2016). Indeed, it has been shown that more generous UI benefits
were associated with longer unemployment spells. However, much less has been said on
the extensive margin impact of UI benefits, that is the effect of receiving any benefit at
all. In this paper, we show that there is a negative and long-lasting impact of receiving
UI benefits on the probability to be employed.
To complement this picture, we then look at other dimensions of employment related
to job quality. The literature on this topic draws less clear-cut conclusions (Nekoei
and Weber, 2017; Card et al., 2007; Schmieder et al., 2016; Lalive, 2007; Van Ours and
Vodopivec, 2008). The standard job search model predicts that receiving UI benefits
would enhance job quality as reservation wages are set higher. However, negative duration
dependence could counterbalance this effect. Tables A34 to A36 show a negative impact
on daily wage, that starts to appear in the medium-run and is still present in the long-run.
However, for the assumption of the RDD to hold, we need to take into account in the
estimation all the workers of the sample without restricting to those being employed. It
means that we impute a zero value to earnings of workers not employed at the different
time horizons. Not considering them in the estimation would mean to condition on
41The corresponding regressions at different time horizons are available upon request.
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an endogenous variable, that is being employed. Then, the negative relationship can
arise both from the negative impact on employment or from a negative impact on daily
earnings, conditional on being employed.
To better disentangle both channels, we look at cumulative earnings over a 2-year
period. This measure allows not to condition on endogenous employment status but still
to capture a potential effect on job quality. The idea is that, over a 2-year horizon, if
the receipt of UI benefits would have a positive and significant impact on daily wage, the
positive effect on wage would have the time to offset the negative effect on employment
probability. Table 6 shows negative coefficients, although standard errors are large. Com-
pliers forego about 30,000e over two years, which amounts to an average monthly loss of
1,250e in gross terms.42 Compared to the average daily wage of control workers reported
in Table A13, it represents a 76% reduction, although the difference in cumulative earn-
ings partly comes from a lower number of days employed, and not necessarily from lower
daily wages. This sizeable effect suggests that, if any, the potential increase in compliers’
daily wage is not large enough to compensate their lower employment probability.
Not to restrict the analysis only to the monetary dimension of job quality, we look at
other outcomes associated to the next employment spell.43 Tables A37 to A40 show the
effect on the probability to have a permanent contract, to work full-time, to work in the
same 2-digit industry as in the previous job and on the duration of the next employment
spell. The effect seems negative on working hours, but positive on the probability to have
a permanent contract, although the duration of the next employment spell is negatively
impacted. However, none of the coefficients associated to these qualitative dimension of
the next employment spell are significant.
Analysing the impact on characteristics of the next employment spell is informative
on the type of jobs found by treated and controls after the reform, but forces to condition
on having a job by the end of the observation period. Any impact we could measure
would then be a mix of treatment and selection effects. We then perform two comple-
42We do not impute values of unemployment benefits in this calculation.
43By construction, individuals who do not find a job within the observed period will have those
variables coded as missing.
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mentary analyses to capture the unconditional impact of receiving UI benefits. The first
method consists in measuring the probability of having a job with a given characteristic
at different time horizons, putting a 0 value both to those not having a job and to those
having a job not meeting the criterion under study. Similar to the analysis of daily wage,
it yields an unbiased estimate of the causal impact of the reform, but it does not allow
to distinguish between the employment probability channel and the quality channel con-
ditional on having a job. In the second method, we use the technique developed by Lee
(2009) to get bounds on the treatment effect on different dimensions of job quality, taking
into account the selection into employment. Results yielded by both techniques can be
found from Tables A41 to A88. All in all, quality dimensions measured unconditionally
seem negatively impacted, which is not surprising given the negative effect on employ-
ment probability. Bounds on treatment effects are generally not very informative as they
are almost centred around zero, except for the probability to have a permanent contract
(Tables A65 and A66). The intervals still include 0 but are to a large extent positive in
the short-run. This result combined with positive (but insignificant) coefficients on the
conditional probability that the next employment spell is under a permanent contract
suggest that there might be a positive impact of UI benefits receipt on this dimension of
job quality. The fact that we do not find any significant positive impact of UI benefits
receipt on the quality of the match - as measured by the probability to work in the same
2-digit industry as before - is not in line with the findings in Davezies and Le Barbanchon
(2017). However, they are examining a different sample (before the 2009 reform) at a
different threshold. They look at the 6-month eligibility threshold whereas we use the
time threshold of the reform. Potential sorting at the eligibility threshold caused by the
eligibility status could affect their results.44
To clarify on the ultimate impact on career path, we propose a measure of stability
in employment over a long-term horizon – 2 years. Therefore, we look at the number and
44As mentioned at the beginning of the section, the assumptions of a regression discontinuity design
around the eligibility threshold may not hold if there is a separation response at the threshold because
the worker becomes eligible to UI benefits.
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duration of the employment spells over the following two years. The idea is to capture
whether the individual does a lot of transitions in and out of employment, and whether
his employment spells are short or not. Indeed, having a higher probability of being
employed at different points in time could still be associated with a highly fragmented
path, if the person goes very often from one job to the other but with short breaks in
between. Table A89 indicates that receiving UI benefits is associated to a lower num-
ber of employment spells over the following two years. This could either be interpreted
positively – a more stable path – or negatively – more time unemployed. The impact on
the number of unemployment spells is positive but insignificant, whereas the impact on
the total number of days employed is negative and significant in the linear specification
(Tables A90 and A91). Those results taken together suggest that receiving UI benefits
does not seem to contribute to a more secured career path.
To clarify the interpretation of our results, we finally complement the analysis by
looking at the employment response using a bivariate probit specification. Indeed, the
regression discontinuity design relying on local polynomial estimation on each side of the
cutoff may not be suitable for binary outcome variables such as probabilities, as they yield
coefficients outside the feasible range. However, bivariate probit relies on a parametric
specification and distributional assumptions,45 which may explain why they may not be
preferred to linear models. We provide the estimation results using a bivariate probit
on the main outcome variable, the employment probability. Tables A27 to A32 display
marginal effects that are qualitatively similar to results obtained using local polynomial
regressions. Receiving UI benefits is predicted to decrease employment probability six
months after the end of the contract by 61 percentage points. The effect remains strong
around 53 percentage points up to 21 months after the end of the contract.
45Notably regarding homoskedasticity, homogenous treatment effect and normally distributed error
terms.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyse the impact of the eligibility criterion that imposes a minimum
employment history to access UI benefits. We complement previous analyses of the impact
of the level of UI benefits (i.e., at the intensive margin) on unemployment duration by
looking at the impact of receiving any UI benefits (i.e., at the extensive margin) both on
transitions in and out of employment. To do so, we take advantage of a French reform
that changed the work history threshold from 6 months over the past 22 months to 4
months over the past 28 months in April, 2009. The first part of the analysis reveals
a jump in the transition rate from employment to unemployment at the UI eligibility
threshold. At the aggregate level, we also observe a change in contract duration that is
consistent with the evolution of the threshold. After the reform, the number of 4-month
fixed-term contracts increased relative to the number of 6-month fixed-term contracts.
Taken together, those results are indicative of a response from both employers and
employees to incentives generated by UI. While employers gain in flexibility through
the opportunity to reduce the length of contracts more easily, workers may be more
prone to accept shorter contracts due to the reform. However, we find that receiving
benefits is predicted to decrease future employment probability, even in the medium
term, without any significant improvement in terms of job quality. In addition to this,
the new norm introduced by the reform regarding the length of working contracts may
incur negative spillovers for some employed workers who are offered shorter contracts.
Overall, our results shed light on the potential detrimental effects of UI rules created to
help unemployed workers securing their situation.
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Main Tables and Figures
Figure 1: Probability of UI registration conditional on
separation (Post-reform, 28-months base reference pe-
riod)
SOURCE: FH-DADS.
NOTE: This graph plots the probability to transit from employment to reg-
istered unemployment conditional on ending a contract, with respect to work
history computed within the last 28 months. The two vertical lines represent,
respectively, 4 months and 6 months of work history. We restrict the sample
to contracts ending between April, 1st, 2009 and December, 31st, 2012, which
corresponds to the post-reform period.
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Figure 2: Probability of UI registration conditional on
separation (Pre-reform, 22-months base reference pe-
riod)
SOURCE: FH-DADS.
NOTE: This graph plots the probability to transit from employment to reg-
istered unemployment conditional on ending a contract, with respect to work
history computed within the last 22 months. The two vertical lines represent,
respectively, 4 months and 6 months of work history. We restrict the sample
to contracts ending between January, 1st, 2004 and March, 30th, 2009, which
corresponds to the pre-reform period.
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Figure 3: Probability to go from employment to regis-
tered unemployment
SOURCE: FH-DADS.
NOTE: This graph plots the biweekly transition rate from employment to
registered unemployment, with respect to work history computed within the
last 28 months. We restrict the sample to contracts beginning after April,
1st, 2009 and we track every transition in and out of employment over the
following two years (post-reform period). A transition rate around 0.01 at
exactly 4 months of work history means that 1% of employed workers at the
beginning of the two-week spell had transited from employment to registered
unemployment within the last 15 days with a work history equal to 4 months
at the end of the two-week spell.
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Figure 4: Probability to go from employment to non-
employment
SOURCE: FH-DADS.
NOTE: This graph plots the biweekly transition rate from employment to
non-employment, with respect to work history computed within the last 28
months. We restrict the sample to contracts beginning after April, 1st, 2009
and we track every transition in and out of employment over the following
two years (post-reform period). A transition rate of 0.27 at exactly 4 months
of work history means that 27% of employed workers at the beginning of the
two-week spell had transited from employment to non-employment within the
last 15 days with a work history equal to 4 months at the end of the two-week
spell.
Table 1: Discontinuity in the transition rate
from employment to registered unemploy-
ment
Probability of transiting from employment to registered unemployment
RD_Estimate 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.010***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 1270880 1270880 1270880
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: The regression shows in a regression discontinuity design spirit the discontinuity in the biweekly
transition rate from employment to UI. The running variable is the work history over the last 28 months and
the cutoff value is 4 months. Bandwidth has been computed using the mean squared error (MSE) optimal
bandwidth selector with a linear specification.
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Figure 5: Transition probability from employment to
non-employment, restricted to full-time workers
SOURCE: UI data (FNA)
NOTE: This graph plots the biweekly transition rate from employment to
non-employment, with respect to work history computed within the last 28
months. We first restrict the sample to contracts beginning after April, 1st,
2009 and we track every transition in and out of employment over the fol-
lowing two years (post-reform period). We then further restrict the sample
to workers with a number of hours corresponding to the working time of a
full-time employee working every day covered by the position, to get rid of
some of the measurement error. A transition rate of 0.1 at exactly 4 months
of work history means that 10% of employed workers at the beginning of the
two-week spell had transited from employment to non-employment within the
last 15 days with a work history equal to 4 months at the end of the two-week
spell.
Table 2: Discontinuity in the transition
rate from employment to non-employment on
full-time workers
Probability of transiting from employment to non-employment
RD_Estimate 0.027*** 0.032*** 0.036***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.010)
Observations 436350 436350 436350
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: The regression shows in a regression discontinuity design spirit the discontinuity in the
biweekly transition rate from employment to non-employment. The running variable is the work
history over the last 28 months and the cutoff value is 4 months. Bandwidth has been computed
using the mean squared error (MSE) optimal bandwidth selector with a linear specification. The
sample has been restricted to workers whose number of hours corresponds to a daily full working
time multiplied by the number of days covered by the position to reduce the probability that the
position does not correspond to an uninterrupted employment spell.
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Figure 6: Yearly evolution of the number of 4-month
contracts relative to 6-month contracts (end of fixed-
term contracts)
SOURCE: MMO
NOTE: This graph plots the yearly evolution in the number of fixed-term 4-
month contracts relative to fixed-term 6-month contracts, with month, year,
sector and firm fixed-effects. The reference year is 2008, the last pre-reform
year. The number of contracts has been computed at the firm × month level,
and then aggregated at the national level. Standard errors are clustered at
the firm level.
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Table 3: Difference-in-difference estimate of
the number of 4-month contracts relative to
6-month contracts (End of fixed-term con-
tracts)
Within firm monthly number of contracts
4-month (versus 6m) contracts 7.44499*** 4.88344*** 3.67946 -0.59904 -0.86041
(1.104302) (0.136075) (2.540706) (0.420878) (0.607546)
Post-reform -0.13257 1.29470*** 1.25968 0.48156 0.37090
(0.281080) (0.336468) (0.898371) (0.567464) (0.814415)
4-month (versus 6m) contracts × Post-reform 0.49209 0.25898 0.24836 1.53001** 2.38411***
(1.396799) (0.161821) (0.455498) (0.605193) (0.912708)
Constant 3.75650*** 4.17694*** 4.83235*** 8.91393*** 13.82090***
(0.256077) (0.241221) (1.724860) (0.433443) (0.603916)
Month fixed-effect No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed-effect No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector fixed-effect No No Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed-effect No No No Yes Yes
Sample Sample 1 Sample 1 Sample 1 Sample 1 Sample 2
Observations 549208 549208 549208 517695 352660
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
SOURCE: MMO.
NOTE: The table shows the difference-in-difference estimate of the number of fixed-term 4-month contracts relative
to fixed-term 6-month contracts before and after the reform, computed at the firm × month level and aggregated at
the national level. The first column displays the raw regression, and month, year, sector and firm fixed-effects are
progressively added. The two last column include all fixed-effects. Construction of Sample 1 is detailed in the paper.
Sample 2 is a restriction to firms observed in both period with at least one 4-month and one 6-month contracts
ending in each period. Standard errors are clustered at the sector level for the 3rd specification, and at the firm
level for the last two ones.
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Figure 7: Within sector change in the number of 4-
month contracts relative to 6-month contracts (end of
fixed-term contracts)
SOURCE: MMO
NOTE: This graph plots the difference-in-difference estimate of the change
in the number of fixed-term 4-month contracts relative to fixed-term 6-month
contracts by sector. The number of contracts has been computed at the
firm × month level, and then aggregated at the national level, with month,
year, and firm fixed-effects. The regression has been run separately in each
sector. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Sectors in red are
the ones identified as having a high separation rate or a high share of very
short contracts (Decree No. 2019-797 of 26 July 2019 on the unemployment
insurance scheme, DARES, 2018).
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Figure 8: Mc Crary test contract ending date distribu-
tion
SOURCE: FH-DADS.
NOTE: This figure is the McCrary (2008) test performed on the sample de-
fined using the methodology detailed in Section 5 at the reform threshold. The
running variable, ending date of the contract, has been normalised around the
time threshold to be equal to 0 at the threshold, -1 six months before, and
+1 six months after. We observe a small discontinuity at the threshold, but
that is driven by regularity in starting and ending date of contracts.
Figure 9: Histogram of the contract ending date fre-
quencies
SOURCE: FH-DADS.
NOTE: The running variable, ending date of the contract, has been nor-
malised around the time threshold to be equal to 0 at the threshold, -1 six
months before, and +1 six months after. The bin size is equal to 0.02.
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Figure 10: Mc Crary test contract ending date distribu-
tion one year before the reform (2008)
SOURCE: FH-DADS.
NOTE: This figure is the McCrary (2008) test performed on the sample de-
fined using the methodology detailed in Section 5, using 2008 as the reform
year. The running variable, ending date of the contract, has been normalised
around the time threshold to be equal to 0 at the threshold, -1 six months
before, and +1 six months after. This placebo tests aims at showing that
the small discontinuity at the time threshold is only driven by regularity in
contract starting and ending dates, as it is the same the year of the reform
and the year before.
Table 4: Impact of separating after the re-
form on UI takeup
Register as unemployed
Linear Quadratic Cubic
RD_Estimate 0.069*** 0.061** 0.058**
(0.021) (0.024) (0.024)
F-stat 72.64 46.38 21.14
Observations 23559 23559 23559
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: This table shows the first-stage regression from the fuzzy regression
discontinuity design. It regresses the probability to open a new UI right on
an assignment variable indicating whether the workers has ended his contract
before or after the reform. It shows that ending a contract after the reform, in
its close neighbourhood, is associated to a strong increase in the probability
of opening a UI right. The bandwidth has been computed using the mean
squared error (MSE) optimal bandwidth selector.
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Figure 11: Probability of opening a UI right
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SOURCE: FH-DADS.
NOTE: This graph shows the relationship between the probability to open
a new UI right and the ending date of the contract. The running variable,
ending date of the contract, has been normalised around the time threshold
to be equal to 0 at the threshold, -1 six months before, and +1 six months
after. The vertical line corresponds to the reform. It shows that ending a
contract after the reform, in its close neighbourhood, is associated to a strong
increase in the probability of opening a UI right.
Table 5: Check of no discontinuity in the dis-
tribution of covariates
Gender Level of
education
Daily wage Fulltime Establishment
size
Treated 0.025 -0.104 -1.094 0.020 24.201
(0.029) (0.237) (4.710) (0.032) (26.674)
Ending date of the contract -0.322*** -0.199 -35.248* -0.112 -15.210
(0.122) (0.829) (20.636) (0.150) (95.425)
Treated=1 × Ending date of the contract 0.308 0.824 -13.588 -0.311 -34.776
(0.200) (1.327) (35.658) (0.253) (161.536)
Constant 0.560*** 4.185*** 58.154*** 0.539*** 64.249***
(0.017) (0.141) (2.695) (0.018) (15.767)
Observations 4739 1341 4384 4104 5388
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: This table reports the regression discontinuity estimates, using each covariate as the dependent variable, to test
the assumption of continuity of the covariates distribution at the threshold. The bandwidth has been computed using the
MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Linear specification.
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Figure 12: Impact of UI eligibility on employment prob-
ability 6 months after
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SOURCE: FH-DADS.
NOTE: The running variable, ending date of the contract, has been nor-
malised around the time threshold to be equal to be equal to 0 at the thresh-
old, -1 six months before, and +1 six months after. Points have been fitted
using a local linear regression with a bandwidth equal to 0.03. The graph plots
the probability of being employed six months after the end of the contract.
Figure 13: Impact of UI eligibility on unemployment
probability 6 months after
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SOURCE: FH-DADS.
NOTE: The running variable, ending date of the contract, has been nor-
malised around the time threshold to be equal to be equal to 0 at the thresh-
old, -1 six months before, and +1 six months after. Points have been fitted
using a local linear regression with a bandwidth equal to 0.03. The graph
plots the probability of being unemployed defined as being registered for UI,
six months after the end of the contract.
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Figure 14: Impact of UI eligibility on labour market
participation probability 6 months after
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SOURCE: FH-DADS.
NOTE: The running variable, ending date of the contract, has been nor-
malised around the time threshold to be equal to be equal to 0 at the thresh-
old, -1 six months before, and +1 six months after. Points have been fitted us-
ing a local linear regression with a bandwidth equal to 0.03. The graphs plots
the probability of being in the labour force defined as being either employed
or in registered unemployment, six months after the end of the contract.
Table 6: Impact of UI benefit receipt on cu-
mulative earnings over two years
Cumulative earnings over 2 years
Linear Quadratic Cubic
RD_Estimate -34790.054* -29929.143 -37389.971
(17979.466) (25519.166) (30919.655)
Observations 23559 23559 23559
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: This table reports the regressions discontinuity estimates of the impact of UI
benefits receipt. The bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal band-
width selector. Linear, quadratic and cubic specifications. The dependent variable
corresponds to earnings accumulated over two years after the end of the contract that
defines the treatment status.
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Appendix - additional Tables and Figures
Table A1: Sample composition (MMO data)
Separation motive Number of observations Number of contracts Number of firms
End of fixed-term contract 22,208,669 67,075,786 181,162
Personal dismissal 1,417,836 4,335,334 115,134
Economic layoff 340,448 1,426,004 35,984
Quits 3,212,904 13,205,768 166,798
Retirement 820,051 2,126,980 85,982
Pre-retirement 16,440 45036 5,148
End of trial period 934,844 4,247,370 87,806
NOTE: This table details the sample composition of the data used to measure the response to
the change in the UI eligibility criterion on contract duration (MMO data, DARES). The number
of contracts corresponds to the weighted number of observations, as some firms are surveyed, and
weights also adjust for under-declaration.
Table A2: Descriptive statistics by work his-
tory
Work history < 6 months Work history ≥ 6 months Difference (2) - (1)
Gender 0.587 0.612 0.025***
(0.0004)
Level of education 4.213 4.488 0.275***
(0.0038)
Hourly wage 13.046 15.586 2.540***
(0.1297)
Permanent contract 0.162 0.463 0.301***
(0.0004)
Fulltime 0.602 0.692 0.090***
(0.0004)
Establishment size 113.390 258.550 145.160***
(0.8760)
Experience on the labour market (years) 5.526 10.794 5.267***
(0.0081)
Daily number of hours worked 4.075 4.187 0.112***
(0.0026)
Probability to hold multiple jobs in a given month 0.054 0.040 -0.014***
(0.0002)
Average number of simultaneous jobs in a given month 1.067 1.049 -0.018***
(0.0001)
Observations 1942608 6491757 8434365
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: This table displays descriptive statistics comparing workers with an employment record of more or less than
6 months over the last 28 months. These statistics have been computed on the sample of workers employed during
the 2004-2012 period using the DADS. Work history has been computed by the authors.
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Figure A1: Probability of UI registration conditional
on separation (Pre-reform, 28-months base reference pe-
riod)
SOURCE: FH-DADS.
NOTE: This graph plots the probability to transit from employment to regis-
tered unemployment with respect to work history computed within the last 28
months. The two vertical lines represent, respectively, 4 months and 6 months
of work history. We restrict the sample to contracts ending between January,
1st, 2004 and March, 30th, 2009, which corresponds to the pre-reform period.
Unlike in the post-reform period, we do not observe any discontinuity at the
4-month threshold.
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Figure A2: Probability of UI registration conditional on
separation (Post-reform, 22-months base reference pe-
riod)
SOURCE: FH-DADS.
NOTE: This graph plots the probability to transit from employment to regis-
tered unemployment with respect to work history computed within the last 22
months. The two vertical lines represent, respectively, 4 months and 6 months
of work history. We restrict the sample to contracts ending between April,
1st, 2009 and December, 31st, 2012, which corresponds to the post-reform
period. Unlike in the pre-reform period, we do not observe any discontinuity
at the 6-month threshold.
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Figure A3: Share of fixed-term contracts of less than
one month in total hiring (France, 2000-2017)
SOURCE: DPAE (ACOSS), DSN (DARES).
NOTE: This figure plots the share of fixed-term contracts of less than one
month in total hiring in France, from 2000 to 2017. It shows that very short
contracts account for most of the employment flows, and that their share has
massively increased throughout the last two decades.
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Table A3: Descriptive statistics by work his-
tory - sectors of activity
Work history < 6 months Work history ≥ 6 months Difference (2) - (1)
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 0.0320 0.0148 -0.0172***
(0.00014)
Extractive industry 0.0002 0.0009 0.0006***
(0.00003)
Manufacturing industry 0.0543 0.1159 0.0616***
(0.00031)
Gas and electricity 0.0011 0.0067 0.0056***
(0.00008)
Water supply, Sanitation, Waste management 0.0020 0.0056 0.0036***
(0.00007)
Construction 0.0483 0.0762 0.0279***
(0.00027)
Retail and wholesale trade; Car repair 0.1344 0.1517 0.0173***
(0.00037)
Transportation and storage 0.0253 0.0635 0.0382***
(0.00024)
Food and accommodation 0.1088 0.0782 -0.0307***
(0.00029)
Information and Communication 0.0378 0.0475 0.0097***
(0.00022)
Financial and Insurance activities 0.0177 0.0364 0.0187***
(0.00018)
Real estate 0.0090 0.0135 0.0045***
(0.00012)
Specialised, scientific and technical activities 0.0425 0.0645 0.0220***
(0.00025)
Administrative services and support activities 0.3772 0.2065 -0.1707***
(0.00044)
Public administration 0.0029 0.0097 0.0068***
(0.00009)
Teaching 0.0093 0.0122 0.0029***
(0.00011)
Health and Social action 0.0367 0.0487 0.0120***
(0.00022)
Art and entertainment 0.0341 0.0221 -0.0120***
(0.00016)
Other services 0.0261 0.0254 -0.0007***
(0.00016)
Extraterritorial activities 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000*
(0.00001)
Observations 1188815 3968959 5157774
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: This table displays descriptive statistics comparing workers with an employment record of more or less than
6 months over the last 28 months. These statistics have been computed on the sample of workers employed during
the 2004-2012 period using the DADS. Work history has been computed by the authors.
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Table A4: Descriptive statistics by work his-
tory – Occupation type
Work history < 6 months Work history ≥ 6 months Difference (2) - (1)
Farmer 0.0001 0.0000 -0.0000***
(0.00001)
Craftsperson 0.0001 0.0007 0.0006***
(0.00002)
Retail trader 0.0004 0.0015 0.0011***
(0.00003)
Head of a company of 10 employees or more 0.0008 0.0047 0.0039***
(0.00005)
Professional activity (doctor, architect, etc.) under a salaried status 0.0005 0.0010 0.0004***
(0.00002)
Civil-servant executives 0.0001 0.0027 0.0026***
(0.00004)
Professors, Scientific occupations 0.0025 0.0048 0.0024***
(0.00005)
Information, art and entertainment 0.0350 0.0208 -0.0142***
(0.00013)
Administration and business executives 0.0122 0.0536 0.0415***
(0.00017)
Specialised executives and engineers 0.0083 0.0414 0.0331***
(0.00015)
Primary school teachers 0.0080 0.0092 0.0013***
(0.00008)
Social work and health intermediate professions 0.0174 0.0192 0.0018***
(0.00011)
Clergy 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000***
(0.00001)
Administrative intermediate professions of the public sector 0.0008 0.0047 0.0038***
(0.00005)
Administrative and business intermediate professions of the private sector 0.0450 0.0829 0.0379***
(0.00021)
Technicians 0.0150 0.0357 0.0207***
(0.00014)
Foreman 0.0050 0.0180 0.0130***
(0.00010)
Civil-servants 0.0174 0.0230 0.0056***
(0.00012)
Supervising officer 0.0115 0.0133 0.0018***
(0.00009)
Administrative employees in firms 0.0874 0.0984 0.0111***
(0.00024)
Commercial employee 0.1201 0.0804 -0.0398***
(0.00023)
Employees providing services to individuals 0.1097 0.0729 -0.0368***
(0.00022)
Skilled worker in the industry 0.0522 0.0721 0.0198***
(0.00021)
Skilled worker in the arts and crafts 0.0789 0.0853 0.0064***
(0.00023)
Driver 0.0322 0.0436 0.0115***
(0.00016)
Skilled worker in retail handling, stocking and transportation 0.0244 0.0262 0.0018***
(0.00013)
Unskilled worker in the industry 0.1529 0.0787 -0.0742***
(0.00024)
Unskilled worker in the arts and crafts 0.0785 0.0570 -0.0215***
(0.00020)
Agricultural worker 0.0331 0.0123 -0.0208***
(0.00011)
Observations 1942564 6491702 8434266
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: This table displays descriptive statistics comparing workers with an employment record of more or less than
6 months over the last 28 months. These statistics have been computed on the sample of workers employed during
the 2004-2012 period using the DADS. Work history has been computed by the authors.
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Table A5: Sectorial distribution of firms with
a high relative increase in 4-month contracts
(End of fixed-term contracts)
High response All other firms Difference (2)-(1)
Manufacture of food, beverages and tobacco products 0.1263 0.0342 -0.0921***
(0.01062)
Manufacture of textiles, wearing apparel, leather and related products 0.0171 0.0083 -0.0088
(0.00529)
Manufacture of wood except furniture, paper, printing 0.0034 0.0072 0.0038
(0.00494)
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 0.0137 0.0084 -0.0053
(0.00532)
Manufacture of rubber, plastic products, and other metallic non mineral products 0.0068 0.0096 0.0027
(0.00569)
Manufacture of basic and fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 0.0137 0.0105 -0.0032
(0.00596)
Manufacture of machinery and equipment 0.0034 0.0067 0.0033
(0.00476)
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers, semi-trailers and other transport equipment 0.0068 0.0077 0.0008
(0.00510)
Water supply; sewerage, waste management and remediation activities 0.0068 0.0061 -0.0007
(0.00455)
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 0.1502 0.1919 0.0417
(0.02301)
Transportation and storage 0.0478 0.0416 -0.0062
(0.01167)
Accommodation and food service activities 0.0819 0.0463 -0.0356**
(0.01228)
Publishing, programming and broadcasting activities 0.0205 0.0173 -0.0032
(0.00762)
Telecommunications 0.0102 0.0060 -0.0042
(0.00451)
Computer programming, consultancy, information service activities 0.0102 0.0085 -0.0018
(0.00535)
Financial and insurance activities 0.0273 0.0316 0.0043
(0.01022)
Real estate activities 0.0068 0.0091 0.0023
(0.00555)
Legal, accounting, management consultancy, architectural and engineering activities; technical testing and analysis 0.0068 0.0269 0.0201*
(0.00945)
Scientific research and development 0.0034 0.0068 0.0034
(0.00479)
Advertising and market research, veterinary, other professional, scientific and technical activities 0.0137 0.0113 -0.0024
(0.00616)
Administrative and support service activities 0.1672 0.1437 -0.0236
(0.02049)
Public administration and defense; compulsory social security 0.0205 0.0132 -0.0073
(0.00666)
Education 0.0341 0.0229 -0.0113
(0.00873)
Human health activities 0.0683 0.0723 0.0040
(0.01513)
Residential care, social work without accommodation activities 0.0614 0.1574 0.0959***
(0.02127)
Arts, entertainment and recreation 0.0444 0.0218 -0.0226**
(0.00853)
Other service activities 0.0273 0.0282 0.0009
(0.00967)
Total 100 100
Observations 293 4955367 4955660
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: The table compares the distribution of sectors in firms with a high relative increase in the number of 4-
month contracts after the reform with all other firms. The relative increase is measured by a difference-in-difference
regression of the number of fixed-term 4-month contracts relative to fixed-term 6-month contracts before and after
the reform, computed within each firm, with sector, month and year fixed-effects. We restricted to firms observed in
the pre and post period, with at least one 4-month and one 6-month contract in each period. Having a high relative
increase in the number of 4-month contracts is defined as having a within firm difference-in-difference coefficient
above the 90th percentile in the distribution of coefficients.
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Figure A4: Difference in the share of each sector between
firms with a high relative increase in 4-month contracts
and all other firms (end of fixed-term contracts)
SOURCE: MMO
NOTE: This graph plots the difference in the share of each sector between
firms with a high relative increase in 4-month contracts after the reform and
all other firms. We keep only the positive points, i.e. sectors that are over-
represented among high-increase firms. The relative increase in the number
of 4-month contracts is measured by a difference-in-difference regression of
the number of fixed-term 4-month contracts relative to fixed-term 6-month
contracts before and after the reform, computed within each firm, with sec-
tor, month and year fixed-effects. We restricted to firms observed in the pre
and post period, with at least one 4-month and one 6-month contract in each
period. Having a high relative increase in the number of 4-month contracts is
defined as having a within firm difference-in-difference coefficient above the
90th percentile in the distribution of coefficients. Sectors in red are the ones
identified as having a high separation rate or a high share of very short con-
tracts (Decree No. 2019-797 of 26 July 2019 on the unemployment insurance
scheme, DARES, 2018).
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Figure A5: Yearly evolution of the number of 4-month
contracts relative to 6-month contracts (economic lay-
offs)
SOURCE: MMO
NOTE: This graph plots the yearly evolution in the number of 4-month con-
tracts relative to 6-month contracts ending as an economic layoff, with month,
year, sector and firm fixed-effects. The number of contracts has been com-
puted at the firm × month level, and then aggregated at the national level.
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
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Figure A6: Yearly evolution of the number of 4-month
contracts relative to 6-month contracts (personal dis-
missals)
SOURCE: MMO
NOTE: This graph plots the yearly evolution in the number of 4-month con-
tracts relative to 6-month contracts ending as a personal dismissal, with
month, year, sector and firm fixed-effects. The reference year is 2008, the
last pre-reform year. The number of contracts has been computed at the firm× month level, and then aggregated at the national level. Standard errors are
clustered at the firm level.
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Figure A7: Within sector change in the number of
4-month contracts relative to 6-month contracts (eco-
nomic layoffs)
SOURCE: MMO
NOTE: This graph plots the difference-in-difference estimate of the change in
the number of 4-month contracts relative to 6-month contracts ending as an
economic layoff by sector. The number of contracts has been computed at the
firm × month level, and then aggregated at the national level, with month,
year, sector and firm fixed-effects. The regression has been run separately in
each sector. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Not all 35 sectors
are represented as the number of observations was not sufficient in some
sectors. Sectors in red are the ones identified as having a high separation rate
or a high share of very short contracts (Decree No. 2019-797 of 26 July 2019
on the unemployment insurance scheme, DARES, 2018).
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Figure A8: Within sector change in the number of 4-
month contracts relative to 6-month contracts (personal
dismissals)
SOURCE: MMO
NOTE: This graph plots the difference-in-difference estimate of the change
in the number of 4-month contracts relative to 6-month contracts ending as a
personal dismissal by sector. The number of contracts has been computed at
the firm × month level, and then aggregated at the national level, with month,
year, sector and firm fixed-effects. The regression has been run separately in
each sector. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Sectors in red are
the ones identified as having a high separation rate or a high share of very
short contracts (Decree No. 2019-797 of 26 July 2019 on the unemployment
insurance scheme, DARES, 2018).
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Figure A9: Yearly evolution of the number of 4-month
contracts relative to 6-month contracts (resignations)
SOURCE: MMO
NOTE: This graph plots the yearly evolution in the number of 4-month con-
tracts relative to 6-month contracts ending as a resignation, with month, year,
sector and firm fixed-effects. The reference year is 2008, the last pre-reform
year. The number of contracts has been computed at the firm × month level,
and then aggregated at the national level. Standard errors are clustered at
the firm level.
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Figure A10: Within sector change in the number of 4-
month contracts relative to 6-month contracts (resigna-
tions)
SOURCE: MMO
NOTE: This graph plots the difference-in-difference estimate of the change
in the number of 4-month contracts relative to 6-month contracts ending as
a resignation by sector. The number of contracts has been computed at the
firm × month level, and then aggregated at the national level, with month,
year, sector and firm fixed-effects. The regression has been run separately in
each sector. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Sectors in red are
the ones identified as having a high separation rate or a high share of very
short contracts (Decree No. 2019-797 of 26 July 2019 on the unemployment
insurance scheme, DARES, 2018).
Table A6: Difference-in-difference estimate
of the number of 4-month contracts relative
to 6-month contracts (Economic layoffs)
Within firm monthly number of contracts
4-month (versus 6m) contracts 0.30040 0.57754 0.42187 0.20505
(0.310263) (0.398772) (0.308982) (0.423318)
Post-reform 2.11316 -1.38976* 1.35330 -1.75507
(2.188388) (0.717226) (1.997292) (1.646634)
4-month (versus 6m) contracts × Post-reform -1.57979 -1.60371*** -0.75299 0.26891
(2.277347) (0.518521) (1.374629) (0.562155)
Constant 1.94096*** 3.86586*** 2.08531** 7.22421***
(0.174215) (0.449624) (0.914280) (0.823544)
Observations 2563 2563 2563 904
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
SOURCE: MMO.
NOTE: The table shows difference-in-difference estimate of the number of 4-month contracts relative to
6-month contracts before and after the reform ending as an economic layoff, computed at the firm × month
level and aggregated at the national level. The first column displays the raw regression, and month, year,
sector and firm fixed-effects are progressively added. Standard errors are clustered at the sector level for the
3rd specification, and at the firm level for the last one.
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Table A7: Difference-in-difference estimate
of the number of 4-month contracts relative
to 6-month contracts (Personal dismissals)
Within firm monthly number of contracts
4-month (versus 6m) contracts -0.11788 -0.12293*** -0.11791 0.10557
(0.121538) (0.045261) (0.143453) (0.083567)
Post-reform 0.31098 1.53765*** 1.47727 1.46555
(0.265350) (0.109400) (0.928783) (1.014531)
4-month (versus 6m) contracts × Post-reform -0.28015 -0.28728*** -0.29325 -0.55718*
(0.279306) (0.059218) (0.398947) (0.338505)
Constant 1.77571*** 1.06971*** 1.10386** 1.34979**
(0.099820) (0.066753) (0.442160) (0.540093)
Observations 54520 54520 54520 41251
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
SOURCE: MMO.
NOTE: The table shows difference-in-difference estimate of the number of 4-month contracts relative to
6-month contracts before and after the reform ending as a personal dismissal, computed at the firm × month
level and aggregated at the national level. The first column displays the raw regression, and month, year,
sector and firm fixed-effects are progressively added. Standard errors are clustered at the sector level for the
3rd specification, and at the firm level for the last one.
Table A8: Difference-in-difference estimate
of the number of 4-month contracts relative
to 6-month contracts (End of trial period)
Within firm monthly number of contracts
4-month (versus 6m) contracts 0.00637 0.01186 0.03827 0.05307
(0.048083) (0.018094) (0.044819) (0.075234)
Post-reform 0.01134 -0.20961*** -0.16306 -0.26112
(0.038568) (0.039613) (0.230984) (0.305089)
4-month (versus 6m) contracts × Post-reform -0.04266 -0.03998* -0.01815 -0.05891
(0.059314) (0.022073) (0.057726) (0.083605)
Constant 1.64216*** 1.79143*** 1.73302*** 1.96070***
(0.023687) (0.028345) (0.140446) (0.191079)
Observations 41258 41258 41258 28982
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
SOURCE: MMO.
NOTE: The table shows difference-in-difference estimate of the number of 4-month contracts relative to
6-month contracts before and after the reform ending during the trial period, computed at the firm × month
level and aggregated at the national level. The first column displays the raw regression, and month, year,
sector and firm fixed-effects are progressively added. Standard errors are clustered at the sector level for the
3rd specification, and at the firm level for the last one.
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Table A9: Difference-in-difference estimate
of the number of 4-month contracts relative
to 6-month contracts (Voluntary resignation)
Within firm monthly number of contracts
4-month (versus 6m) contracts 0.37476** 0.33881*** 0.24660 0.06009
(0.155234) (0.026209) (0.206972) (0.044961)
Post-reform -0.02598 -1.10184*** -0.97563 -1.69439
(0.040873) (0.067227) (1.235164) (1.618877)
4-month (versus 6m) contracts ×Post-reform -0.28319* -0.24381*** -0.18222 0.01393
(0.165990) (0.034037) (0.176098) (0.061971)
Constant 1.62898*** 2.26422*** 2.22125*** 2.91428***
(0.027401) (0.041236) (0.671168) (0.931143)
Observations 168664 168664 168664 142416
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
SOURCE: MMO.
NOTE: The table shows difference-in-difference estimate of the number of 4-month contracts relative to
6-month contracts before and after the reform ending as a resignation, computed at the firm × month level
and aggregated at the national level. The first column displays the raw regression, and month, year, sector
and firm fixed-effects are progressively added. Standard errors are clustered at the sector level for the 3rd
specification, and at the firm level for the last one.
Table A10: Difference-in-difference estimate
of the number of 4-month contracts relative
to 6-month contracts (Retirement)
Within firm monthly number of contracts
4-month (versus 6m) contracts -0.17310 -0.07902 -0.05755 -0.11393
(0.131355) (0.061660) (0.096664) (0.137914)
Post-reform -0.14139 -0.31085 -0.31163* -0.66726*
(0.129628) (0.205566) (0.157997) (0.370642)
4-month (versus 6m) contracts × Post-reform 0.29047 0.04742 -0.00482 0.16945
(0.238324) (0.080463) (0.182940) (0.194480)
Constant 1.71333*** 1.83491*** 1.83975*** 2.27758***
(0.075188) (0.122873) (0.085550) (0.199458)
Observations 3614 3614 3614 1214
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
SOURCE: MMO.
NOTE: The table shows difference-in-difference estimate of the number of 4-month contracts relative to
6-month contracts before and after the reform ending as a retirement, computed at the firm × month level
and aggregated at the national level. The first column displays the raw regression, and month, year, sector
and firm fixed-effects are progressively added. Standard errors are clustered at the sector level for the 3rd
specification, and at the firm level for the last one.
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Table A11: Difference-in-difference estimate
of the number of 4-month contracts relative
to 6-month contracts (Pre-retirement)
Within firm monthly number of contracts
4-month (versus 6m) contracts 3.09464* 1.45730*** -0.24507
(1.684594) (0.525373) (0.435111)
Post-reform -0.14827 -0.87115 -0.85619*
(0.228724) (1.218646) (0.429935)
4-month (versus 6m) contracts × Post-reform -1.57978 -1.08176* 0.87408**
(1.966535) (0.574451) (0.369557)
Constant 1.27309*** 2.80715** 2.57142***
(0.220178) (1.070311) (0.410223)
Observations 79 79 72
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
SOURCE: MMO.
NOTE: The table shows difference-in-difference estimate of the number of 4-month contracts relative to
6-month contracts before and after the reform ending as a pre-retirement, computed at the firm × month
level and aggregated at the national level. The first column displays the raw regression, and month, year
and sector fixed-effects are progressively added. Firm fixed-effects cannot be added due to the small number
of observations. Standard errors are clustered at the sector level for the 3rd specification, and at the firm
level for the last one.
Table A12: Post-reform evolution of 4 to 5-
month contracts (6-month and 1 to 3-month
control group)
Proportion among contracts ≤1 year Proportion among contracts ≤1 year
Post-reform -0.00515*** -0.00500***
(0.0000395) (0.0000549)
4 to 5-month contracts -0.06441*** -0.06436***
(0.0000649) (0.0001418)
Post-reform × 4 to 5-month contracts 0.01470*** 0.01451***
(0.0000811) (0.0001751)
Constant 0.08778*** 0.08758***
(0.0000298) (0.0000414)
Observations 122867 299939
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
SOURCE: UI data (FNA). The data comes from UI records, and gathers all contracts that were immediately
followed by a UI right. To keep the same sample definition throughout the years, we excluded workers who
registered with a work history between four and six months as they would not be registered in UI data before
the reform.
NOTE: The first specification shows the difference in the evolution of the shares of 4-month and 6-month
contracts. The second specification compares 4-month contracts to contracts between 1 and 3 months.
Shares have been computed among contracts of one year and less. All types of separation are considered.
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Figure A11: Share of contracts among contracts of 1
year or less (all separations)
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SOURCE: UI data (FNA).
NOTE: This figure plots the share of contracts of respectively one, four, six,
and ten-month duration among contracts of one year and less, for all types of
separations, between 2005 and 2014 in France. The vertical line corresponds
to the 2009 reform that shortened the UI eligibility criterion in terms of
employment record from four months to six months. The data comes from
UI records, and gathers all contracts that were immediately followed by a UI
right. To keep the same sample definition throughout the years, we excluded
workers who registered with a work history between four and six months as
they would not be registered in UI data before the reform.
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Figure A12: Share of 1 to 30-day contracts among con-
tracts of 1 year or less
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SOURCE: UI data (FNA).
NOTE: This graph plots the share of contracts between 1 and 30 days that
have started before April, 2009, 2010 and 2011 respectively, and ended after
that time threshold, among all contracts of one year and less. The objective
is to test the hypothesis that there was not an increase in the share of 1 to
30-day contract signed before the reform but ending after, as an anticipation
of the reform. The fact that the three lines look similar is evidence that such
anticipation did not occur.
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Figure A13: Share of 31 to 60-day contracts among con-
tracts of 1 year or less
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SOURCE: UI data (FNA).
NOTE: This graph plots the share of contracts between 31 and 60 days that
have started before April, 2009, 2010 and 2011 respectively, and ended after
that time threshold, among all contracts of one year and less. The objective
is to test the hypothesis that there was not an increase in the share of 31 to
60-day contract signed before the reform but ending after, as an anticipation
of the reform. The fact that the three lines look similar is evidence that such
anticipation did not occur.
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Figure A14: Share of 61 to 90-day contracts among con-
tracts of 1 year or less
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SOURCE: UI data (FNA).
NOTE: This graph plots the share of contracts between 61 and 90 days that
have started before April, 2009, 2010 and 2011 respectively, and ended after
that time threshold, among all contracts of one year and less. The objective
is to test the hypothesis that there was not an increase in the share of 61 to
90-day contract signed before the reform but ending after, as an anticipation
of the reform. The fact that the three lines look similar is evidence that such
anticipation did not occur.
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Figure A15: Share of 91 to 120-day contracts among
contracts of 1 year or less
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SOURCE: UI data (FNA).
NOTE: This graph plots the share of contracts between 91 and 120 days that
have started before April, 2009, 2010 and 2011 respectively, and ended after
that time threshold, among all contracts of one year and less. The objective
is to test the hypothesis that there was not an increase in the share of 91 to
120-day contract signed before the reform but ending after, as an anticipation
of the reform. The fact that the three lines look similar is evidence that such
anticipation did not occur.
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Figure A16: Share of 121 to 150-days contracts among
contracts of 1 year or less
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SOURCE: UI data (FNA).
NOTE: This graph plots the share of contracts between 121 and 150 days that
have started before April, 2009, 2010 and 2011 respectively, and ended after
that time threshold, among all contracts of one year and less. The objective
is to test the hypothesis that there was not an increase in the share of 121 to
150-day contract signed before the reform but ending after, as an anticipation
of the reform. The fact that the three lines look similar is evidence that such
anticipation did not occur.
71
Table A13: Descriptive statistics on treated
and control workers
Treated Control Difference (2)-(1)
Gender 0.58 0.59 0.01(0.008)
Level of education 4.25 4.18 -0.07(0.070)
Daily wage 44.66 53.28 8.61***(1.254)
Fulltime 0.48 0.56 0.08***(0.008)
Establishment size 96.59 79.11 -17.48*(8.145)
Observations 5401 18158 23559
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
SOURCE: FH-DADS.
NOTE: This table compares the observable characteristics of treated and
control workers. Treated workers are defined as workers ending a fixed-term
contract after the reform that has started before the reform, and with a
work history between four and six months. Control workers are defined the
same way, except that they end their contract before the reform. In total,
they account for 23,559 observations. The reform, enacted in April, 1st,
2009, has reduced the employment record condition from six months over the
last twenty-two months to four months over the last twenty-eight months.
The time period considered corresponds to October, 2008-September, 2009.
Control workers have, on average, a higher daily wage, and work in smaller
firms.
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Table A14: Descriptive statistics on takers
and non-takers
Takers Treated non takers Difference
Gender 0.57 0.58 0.02
(0.020)
Level of education 4.36 4.23 -0.13
(0.171)
Daily wage 62.30 41.92 -20.38***
(1.422)
Fulltime 0.76 0.44 -0.32***
(0.019)
Establishment size 99.58 96.12 -3.46
(24.431)
Work history over the last 28 months 157.15 152.32 -4.83***
(0.821)
Observations 727 4674 5401
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: The two columns compare the characteristics of treated workers eligible to UI benefits
and deciding to claim or not to claim them. Treated workers are defined as workers ending
a fixed-term contract after the reform that has started before the reform, and with a work
history between four and six months. In total, they account for 5,401 observations. The
reform, enacted in April, 1st, 2009, has reduced the employment record condition from six
months over the last twenty-two months to four months over the last twenty-eight months.
The time period considered corresponds to October, 2008-September, 2009. Takers have, on
average, a higher daily wage, and work more hours.
Figure A17: Distribution of the female proportion with
respect to contract ending date
SOURCE: FH-DADS.
NOTE: This figure shows the distribution of the proportion of female workers
with respect to the contract ending date. The vertical line corresponds to the
reform. It shows that there is no significant discontinuity at the threshold,
confirming that workers are statistically similar at both sides of the threshold.
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Figure A18: Distribution of the proportion of fulltime
workers with respect to contract ending date
SOURCE: FH-DADS.
NOTE: This figure shows the distribution of the proportion of full-time work-
ers with respect to the contract ending date. The vertical line corresponds to
the reform. There is a discontinuity at the threshold, but it seems that it is
rather driven by the non-linearity of the relationship between the proportion
of full-time workers and the ending date of the contract. Table 5 shows that
the more demanding RDD regression on the full-time variable does not yield
a significant coefficient, confirming that workers are statistically similar at
both sides of the threshold.
Figure A19: Distribution of the establishment size with
respect to contract ending date
SOURCE: FH-DADS.
NOTE: This figure shows the distribution of the establishment size with re-
spect to the contract ending date. The vertical line corresponds to the reform.
It shows that there is no significant discontinuity at the threshold, confirming
that workers are statistically similar at both sides of the threshold.
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Figure A20: Distribution of the daily wage with respect
to contract ending date
SOURCE: FH-DADS.
NOTE: This figure shows the distribution of the wage with respect to the
contract ending date. The vertical line corresponds to the reform. It shows
that there is no significant discontinuity at the threshold, confirming that
workers are statistically similar at both sides of the threshold.
Figure A21: Distribution of the education level with
respect to contract ending date
SOURCE: FH-DADS.
NOTE: This figure shows the distribution of the education level with respect
to the contract ending date. The vertical line corresponds to the reform. It
shows that there is no significant discontinuity at the threshold, confirming
that workers are statistically similar at both sides of the threshold.
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Figure A22: Magnitude of the difference in covariates at
the cutoff
−50 0 50 100
Gender Education
Wage Fulltime
Establishment size
SOURCE: FH-DADS.
NOTE: This graph shows the difference in the distribution of several co-
variates between workers located at each side of the threshold in its close
neighborhood. Coefficients and standard errors have been obtained from the
RDD estimates using each covariate as the dependent variable. The three lev-
els of significance of the confidence intervals depicted are 5%, 1% and 0.1%.
It shows that none of the tested variables significantly differ from one side of
the threshold to the other in a discontinuous way, ensuring that there is no
sorting of workers at the threshold.
Table A15: Impact of UI benefits receipt
on employment probability (1-4 months) –
Quadratic specification
Probability of
being employed
1 months after
Probability of
being employed
2 months after
Probability of
being employed
3 months after
Probability of
being employed
4 months after
RD_Estimate 0.326 0.681 -0.589 -0.742
(0.687) (0.774) (0.548) (0.663)
Observations 23559 23559 23559 23559
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: This table reports the regressions discontinuity estimates of the impact of UI benefits receipt. The
bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Quadratic specification. The
dependent variable corresponds to the probability of being employed at different time horizons after the end
of the contract that defines the treatment status.
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Table A16: Impact of UI benefits receipt
on employment probability (5-8 months) –
Quadratic specification
Probability of
being employed
5 months after
Probability of
being employed
6 months after
Probability of
being employed
7 months after
Probability of
being employed
8 months after
RD_Estimate -0.710 -0.795 -1.068* -1.337**
(0.662) (0.708) (0.612) (0.654)
Observations 23559 23559 23559 23559
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: This table reports the regressions discontinuity estimates of the impact of UI benefits receipt. The
bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Quadratic specification. The
dependent variable corresponds to the probability of being employed at different time horizons after the end
of the contract that defines the treatment status.
Table A17: Impact of UI benefits receipt
on employment probability (9-12 months) –
Quadratic specification
Probability of
being employed
9 months after
Probability of
being employed
10 months after
Probability of
being employed
11 months after
Probability of
being employed
12 months after
RD_Estimate -0.481 -1.361* -1.198* -0.653
(0.564) (0.707) (0.667) (0.653)
Observations 23559 23559 23559 23559
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: This table reports the regressions discontinuity estimates of the impact of UI benefits receipt. The
bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Quadratic specification. The
dependent variable corresponds to the probability of being employed at different time horizons after the end
of the contract that defines the treatment status.
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Table A18: Impact of UI benefits receipt
on employment probability (13-16 months)
– Quadratic specification
Probability of
being employed
13 months after
Probability of
being employed
14 months after
Probability of
being employed
15 months after
Probability of
being employed
16 months after
RD_Estimate -0.665 -0.663 -0.826 -0.819
(0.632) (0.654) (0.656) (0.616)
Observations 23559 23559 23559 23559
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: This table reports the regressions discontinuity estimates of the impact of UI benefits receipt. The
bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Quadratic specification. The
dependent variable corresponds to the probability of being employed at different time horizons after the end
of the contract that defines the treatment status.
Table A19: Impact of UI benefits receipt
on employment probability (17-20 months)
– Quadratic specification
Probability of
being employed
17 months after
Probability of
being employed
18 months after
Probability of
being employed
19 months after
Probability of
being employed
20 months after
RD_Estimate -0.766 -0.929 -1.064 -1.128
(0.663) (0.703) (0.732) (0.749)
Observations 23559 23559 23559 23559
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: This table reports the regressions discontinuity estimates of the impact of UI benefits receipt. The
bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Quadratic specification. The
dependent variable corresponds to the probability of being employed at different time horizons after the end
of the contract that defines the treatment status.
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Table A20: Impact of UI benefits receipt
on employment probability (21-24 months)
– Quadratic specification
Probability of
being employed
21 months after
Probability of
being employed
22 months after
Probability of
being employed
23 months after
Probability of
being employed
24 months after
RD_Estimate -1.510** -0.145 0.244 0.490
(0.719) (0.583) (0.646) (0.682)
Observations 23559 23559 23559 23559
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: This table reports the regressions discontinuity estimates of the impact of UI benefits receipt. The
bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Quadratic specification. The
dependent variable corresponds to the probability of being employed at different time horizons after the end
of the contract that defines the treatment status.
Table A21: Impact of UI benefits receipt on
employment probability (1-4 months)
Probability of
being employed
1 months after
Probability of
being employed
2 months after
Probability of
being employed
3 months after
Probability of
being employed
4 months after
RD_Estimate 0.023 0.019 -0.536 -0.902*
(0.556) (0.495) (0.426) (0.488)
Observations 23559 23559 23559 23559
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: This table reports the regressions discontinuity estimates of the impact of UI benefits receipt.
The bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Linear specification. The
dependent variable corresponds to the probability of being employed at different time horizons after the end
of the contract that defines the treatment status.
Table A22: Impact of UI benefits receipt on
employment probability (5-8 months)
Probability of
being employed
5 months after
Probability of
being employed
6 months after
Probability of
being employed
7 months after
Probability of
being employed
8 months after
RD_Estimate -0.895* -1.068** -1.020** -1.141***
(0.492) (0.494) (0.469) (0.342)
Observations 23559 23559 23559 23559
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: This table reports the regressions discontinuity estimates of the impact of UI benefits receipt.
The bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Linear specification. The
dependent variable corresponds to the probability of being employed at different time horizons after the end
of the contract that defines the treatment status.
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Table A23: Impact of UI benefits receipt on
employment probability (9-12 months)
Probability of
being employed
9 months after
Probability of
being employed
10 months after
Probability of
being employed
11 months after
Probability of
being employed
12 months after
RD_Estimate -0.376 -0.949** -0.978** -0.695
(0.381) (0.453) (0.455) (0.438)
Observations 23559 23559 23559 23559
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: This table reports the regressions discontinuity estimates of the impact of UI benefits receipt.
The bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Linear specification. The
dependent variable corresponds to the probability of being employed at different time horizons after the end
of the contract that defines the treatment status.
Table A24: Impact of UI benefits receipt on
employment probability (13-16 months)
Probability of
being employed
13 months after
Probability of
being employed
14 months after
Probability of
being employed
15 months after
Probability of
being employed
16 months after
RD_Estimate -0.641 -0.719 -0.684 -0.772*
(0.453) (0.446) (0.435) (0.438)
Observations 23559 23559 23559 23559
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: This table reports the regressions discontinuity estimates of the impact of UI benefits receipt.
The bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Linear specification. The
dependent variable corresponds to the probability of being employed at different time horizons after the end
of the contract that defines the treatment status.
Table A25: Impact of UI benefits receipt on
employment probability (17-20 months)
Probability of
being employed
17 months after
Probability of
being employed
18 months after
Probability of
being employed
19 months after
Probability of
being employed
20 months after
RD_Estimate -0.779* -0.979** -0.940** -1.064**
(0.461) (0.480) (0.453) (0.486)
Observations 23559 23559 23559 23559
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: This table reports the regressions discontinuity estimates of the impact of UI benefits receipt.
The bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Linear specification. The
dependent variable corresponds to the probability of being employed at different time horizons after the end
of the contract that defines the treatment status.
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Table A26: Impact of UI benefits receipt on
employment probability (21-24 months)
Probability of
being employed
21 months after
Probability of
being employed
22 months after
Probability of
being employed
23 months after
Probability of
being employed
24 months after
RD_Estimate -1.108** 0.069 0.079 0.048
(0.444) (0.437) (0.428) (0.424)
Observations 23559 23559 23559 23559
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: This table reports the regressions discontinuity estimates of the impact of UI benefits receipt.
The bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Linear specification. The
dependent variable corresponds to the probability of being employed at different time horizons after the end
of the contract that defines the treatment status.
Table A27: Impact of UI receipt on employ-
ment probability (1-4 months) - Bivariate
probit
Probability of
being employed
1 month after
Probability of
being employed
2 months after
Probability of
being employed
3 months after
Probability of
being employed
4 months after
Being registered to UI 0.282 0.350 -0.370 -0.608***
(0.849) (0.416) (0.410) (0.144)
Ending date of the contract -0.737*** -0.498*** -0.048 -0.116
(0.121) (0.089) (0.146) (0.090)
Contract ending date × Treated 0.201 0.385 0.634* 0.610**
(1.268) (0.858) (0.356) (0.267)
Observations 3189 3913 4693 4150
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: The bivariate probit has been computed on the sample restricted to a window around the threshold
defined by the same MSE-optimal bandwidth selector as for the RDD, and using triangular kernel weights.
Linear specification. The dependent variable corresponds to the probability of being employed at different
time horizons after the end of the contract that defines the treatment status.
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Table A28: Impact of UI receipt on employ-
ment probability (5-8 months) - Bivariate
probit
Probability of
being employed
5 months after
Probability of
being employed
6 months after
Probability of
being employed
7 months after
Probability of
being employed
8 months after
Being registered to UI -0.524** -0.614*** -0.639*** -0.619***
(0.217) (0.132) (0.126) (0.082)
Ending date of the contract -0.290** -0.229*** -0.183** -0.132***
(0.122) (0.087) (0.078) (0.040)
Contract ending date × Treated 0.677** 0.570** 0.538** 0.546***
(0.313) (0.254) (0.233) (0.129)
Observations 4150 4384 4693 6833
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: The bivariate probit has been computed on the sample restricted to a window around the threshold
defined by the same MSE-optimal bandwidth selector as for the RDD, and using triangular kernel weights.
Linear specification. The dependent variable corresponds to the probability of being employed at different
time horizons after the end of the contract that defines the treatment status.
Table A29: Impact of UI receipt on employ-
ment probability (9-12 months) - Bivariate
probit
Probability of
being employed
9 months after
Probability of
being employed
10 months after
Probability of
being employed
11 months after
Probability of
being employed
12 months after
Being registered to UI 0.065 -0.437** -0.496*** -0.336
(1.102) (0.177) (0.178) (0.301)
Ending date of the contract -0.133 0.263*** 0.175** 0.053
(0.267) (0.069) (0.072) (0.105)
Contract ending date × Treated 0.231 0.743*** 0.760*** 0.659**
(0.848) (0.227) (0.216) (0.266)
Observations 5388 5014 5014 4927
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: The bivariate probit has been computed on the sample restricted to a window around the threshold
defined by the same MSE-optimal bandwidth selector as for the RDD, and using triangular kernel weights.
Linear specification. The dependent variable corresponds to the probability of being employed at different
time horizons after the end of the contract that defines the treatment status.
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Table A30: Impact of UI receipt on employ-
ment probability (13-16 months) - Bivariate
probit
Probability of
being employed
13 months after
Probability of
being employed
14 months after
Probability of
being employed
15 months after
Probability of
being employed
16 months after
Being registered to UI -0.270 -0.305 -0.313 -0.352*
(0.324) (0.297) (0.267) (0.212)
Ending date of the contract -0.064 -0.041 -0.028 -0.088
(0.123) (0.109) (0.096) (0.084)
Contract ending date × Treated 0.657** 0.415 0.300 0.387
(0.312) (0.293) (0.274) (0.248)
Observations 4499 4739 4927 4927
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: The bivariate probit has been computed on the sample restricted to a window around the threshold
defined by the same MSE-optimal bandwidth selector as for the RDD, and using triangular kernel weights.
Linear specification. The dependent variable corresponds to the probability of being employed at different
time horizons after the end of the contract that defines the treatment status.
Table A31: Impact of UI receipt on employ-
ment probability (17-20 months) - Bivariate
probit
Probability of
being employed
17 months after
Probability of
being employed
18 months after
Probability of
being employed
19 months after
Probability of
being employed
20 months after
Being registered to UI -0.361 -0.535*** -0.542*** -0.532***
(0.222) (0.142) (0.144) (0.127)
Ending date of the contract -0.209** -0.155** -0.127* -0.206***
(0.101) (0.076) (0.068) (0.071)
Contract ending date × Treated 0.669** 0.609*** 0.448** 0.649***
(0.265) (0.220) (0.213) (0.200)
Observations 4443 4499 5014 4869
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: The bivariate probit has been computed on the sample restricted to a window around the threshold
defined by the same MSE-optimal bandwidth selector as for the RDD, and using triangular kernel weights.
Linear specification. The dependent variable corresponds to the probability of being employed at different
time horizons after the end of the contract that defines the treatment status.
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Table A32: Impact of UI receipt on employ-
ment probability (21-24 months) - Bivariate
probit
Probability of
being employed
21 months after
Probability of
being employed
22 months after
Probability of
being employed
23 months after
Probability of
being employed
24 months after
Being registered to UI -0.622*** -0.038 0.107 0.025
(0.085) (0.375) (0.372) (0.369)
Ending date of the contract 0.023 0.186 -0.024 -0.045
(0.051) (0.130) (0.129) (0.126)
Contract ending date × Treated 0.621*** 0.191 0.233 0.249
(0.149) (0.356) (0.362) (0.341)
Observations 5227 4499 4739 4739
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: The bivariate probit has been computed on the sample restricted to a window around the threshold
defined by the same MSE-optimal bandwidth selector as for the RDD, and using triangular kernel weights.
Linear specification. The dependent variable corresponds to the probability of being employed at different
time horizons after the end of the contract that defines the treatment status.
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Table A33: Impact of UI benefits receipt on
the duration to next job
Duration until next job
Linear Quadratic Cubic
RD_Estimate 410.259* 586.974 750.566
(238.507) (417.329) (546.979)
Observations 21291 21291 21291
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: This table reports the regressions discontinuity estimates of the impact of UI benefits
receipt. The bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal bandwidth selector.
Quadratic specification. The dependent variable corresponds to the probability of being
employed at different time horizons after the end of the contract that defines the treatment
status.
Table A34: Impact of UI benefits receipt on
daily earnings (1-4 months)
Daily gross earnings
1 months
after
2 months
after
3 months
after
4 months
after
5 months
after
6 months
after
7 months
after
8 months
after
RD_Estimate 13.897 24.483 -31.527 -54.548 -49.795 -38.757 -39.499 -51.429
(49.214) (49.405) (34.263) (33.992) (34.323) (35.528) (39.134) (32.737)
Observations 23559 23559 23559 23559 23559 23559 23559 23559
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: This table reports the regressions discontinuity estimates of the impact of UI benefits receipt. The bandwidth
has been computed using the MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Linear specification. The dependent variable
corresponds to daily earnings at different time horizons after the end of the contract that defines the treatment
status. Workers not employed at the considered date are included in the regression with earnings equal to zero
Table A35: Impact of UI benefits receipt on
daily earnings (5-8 months)
Daily gross earnings
9 months
after
10 months
after
11 months
after
12 months
after
13 months
after
14 months
after
15 months
after
16 months
after
RD_Estimate -12.723 -52.716* -62.717** -40.706 -19.179 -46.364 -70.580** -72.175**
(28.145) (31.908) (30.623) (32.084) (37.119) (37.597) (35.968) (35.160)
Observations 23559 23559 23559 23559 23559 23559 23559 23559
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: This table reports the regressions discontinuity estimates of the impact of UI benefits receipt. The bandwidth
has been computed using the MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Linear specification. The dependent variable
corresponds to daily earnings at different time horizons after the end of the contract that defines the treatment
status. Workers not employed at the considered date are included in the regression with earnings equal to zero
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Table A36: Impact of UI benefits receipt on
daily earnings (9-12 months)
Daily gross earnings
17 months
after
18 months
after
19 months
after
20 months
after
21 months
after
22 months
after
23 months
after
24 months
after
RD_Estimate -65.922* -68.088* -47.716 -66.245* -80.080** -17.829 -26.430 -40.600
(36.111) (36.053) (38.250) (35.396) (33.910) (31.402) (32.600) (35.723)
Observations 23559 23559 23559 23559 23559 23559 23559 23559
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: This table reports the regressions discontinuity estimates of the impact of UI benefits receipt. The bandwidth
has been computed using the MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Linear specification. The dependent variable
corresponds to daily earnings at different time horizons after the end of the contract that defines the treatment
status. Workers not employed at the considered date are included in the regression with earnings equal to zero
Table A37: Impact of UI benefit receipt on
the probability to have a permanent contract
Permanent contract
Linear Quadratic Cubic
RD_Estimate 0.287 0.364 0.623
(0.359) (0.513) (0.849)
Observations 20898 20898 20898
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: This table reports the regressions discontinuity estimates of the impact of UI
benefits receipt. The bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal band-
width selector. Linear, quadratic and cubic specifications. The dependent variable
corresponds to the probability that the contract following the end of the contract that
defines the treatment status is permanent. Workers who do not find a job by the end
of the observed period are treated as missing. The probability is then conditional on
having found a job by the end of the observed period
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Table A38: Impact of UI benefit receipt on
the probability to work full-time
Full-time job
Linear Quadratic Cubic
RD_Estimate -0.330 -1.034 -1.673
(0.410) (0.714) (1.104)
Observations 21243 21243 21243
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: This table reports the regressions discontinuity estimates of the impact of UI
benefits receipt. The bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal band-
width selector. Linear, quadratic and cubic specifications. The dependent variable
corresponds to the probability that the contract following the end of the contract
that defines the treatment status is full-time. Workers who do not find a job by the
end of the observed period are treated as missing. The probability is then conditional
on having found a job by the end of the observed period
Table A39: Impact of UI benefit receipt on
the probability to work in the same 2-digit
industry
Same industry
Linear Quadratic Cubic
RD_Estimate -0.578 0.284 0.072
(0.501) (1.128) (1.079)
Observations 21180 21180 21180
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: This table reports the regressions discontinuity estimates of the impact of UI
benefits receipt. The bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal band-
width selector. Linear, quadratic and cubic specifications. The dependent variable
corresponds to the probability that the contract following the end of the contract
that defines the treatment status is in the same 2-digit industry as the previous one.
Workers who do not find a job by the end of the observed period are treated as
missing. The probability is then conditional on having found a job by the end of the
observed period
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Table A40: Impact of UI benefit receipt on
the duration of the contract
Duration of the next employment spell
Linear Quadratic Cubic
RD_Estimate -244.861 -373.511 -631.482
(269.854) (376.109) (599.540)
Observations 21291 21291 21291
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: This table reports the regressions discontinuity estimates of the impact of UI
benefits receipt. The bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal band-
width selector. Linear, quadratic and cubic specifications. The dependent variable
corresponds to the probability that the contract following the end of the contract that
defines the treatment status is permanent. Workers who do not find a job by the end
of the observed period are treated as missing. The probability is then conditional on
having found a job by the end of the observed period
Table A41: Impact of UI benefits receipt on
probability of having a permanent contract
(1-4 months)
Probability of
having a
permanent
contract 1
months after
Probability of
having a
permanent
contract 2
months after
Probability of
having a
permanent
contract 3
months after
Probability of
having a
permanent
contract 4
months after
RD_Estimate -0.094 0.108 -0.118 -0.254
(0.309) (0.341) (0.313) (0.331)
Observations 23559 23559 23559 23559
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: This table reports the regressions discontinuity estimates of the impact of UI benefits receipt.
The bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Linear specification. The
dependent variable corresponds to the probability of working under a permanent contract at different time
horizons after the end of the contract that defines the treatment status. The probability of having a
permanent contract is unconditional, in the sense that it is set to zero if the person is not employed.
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Table A42: Impact of UI benefits receipt on
probability of having a permanent contract
(5-8 months)
Probability of
having a
permanent
contract 5
months after
Probability of
having a
permanent
contract 6
months after
Probability of
having a
permanent
contract 7
months after
Probability of
having a
permanent
contract 8
months after
RD_Estimate -0.376 -0.385 -0.274 -0.500*
(0.333) (0.310) (0.317) (0.289)
Observations 23559 23559 23559 23559
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: This table reports the regressions discontinuity estimates of the impact of UI benefits receipt.
The bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Linear specification. The
dependent variable corresponds to the probability of working under a permanent contract at different time
horizons after the end of the contract that defines the treatment status. The probability of having a
permanent contract is unconditional, in the sense that it is set to zero if the person is not employed.
Table A43: Impact of UI benefits receipt on
probability of having a permanent contract
(9-12 months)
Probability of
having a
permanent
contract 9
months after
Probability of
having a
permanent
contract 10
months after
Probability of
having a
permanent
contract 11
months after
Probability of
having a
permanent
contract 12
months after
RD_Estimate -0.254 -0.679** -0.533 -0.469
(0.303) (0.339) (0.343) (0.320)
Observations 23559 23559 23559 23559
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: This table reports the regressions discontinuity estimates of the impact of UI benefits receipt.
The bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Linear specification. The
dependent variable corresponds to the probability of working under a permanent contract at different time
horizons after the end of the contract that defines the treatment status. The probability of having a
permanent contract is unconditional, in the sense that it is set to zero if the person is not employed.
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Table A44: Impact of UI benefits receipt on
probability of having a permanent contract
(13-16 months)
Probability of
having a
permanent
contract 13
months after
Probability of
having a
permanent
contract 14
months after
Probability of
having a
permanent
contract 15
months after
Probability of
having a
permanent
contract 16
months after
RD_Estimate -0.499 -0.509 -0.694** -0.667*
(0.366) (0.336) (0.343) (0.346)
Observations 23559 23559 23559 23559
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: This table reports the regressions discontinuity estimates of the impact of UI benefits receipt.
The bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Linear specification. The
dependent variable corresponds to the probability of working under a permanent contract at different time
horizons after the end of the contract that defines the treatment status. The probability of having a
permanent contract is unconditional, in the sense that it is set to zero if the person is not employed.
Table A45: Impact of UI benefits receipt on
probability of having a permanent contract
(17-20 months)
Probability of
having a
permanent
contract 17
months after
Probability of
having a
permanent
contract 18
months after
Probability of
having a
permanent
contract 19
months after
Probability of
having a
permanent
contract 20
months after
RD_Estimate -0.408 -0.448 -0.476 -0.754**
(0.337) (0.333) (0.343) (0.362)
Observations 23559 23559 23559 23559
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: This table reports the regressions discontinuity estimates of the impact of UI benefits receipt.
The bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Linear specification. The
dependent variable corresponds to the probability of working under a permanent contract at different time
horizons after the end of the contract that defines the treatment status. The probability of having a
permanent contract is unconditional, in the sense that it is set to zero if the person is not employed.
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Table A46: Impact of UI benefits receipt on
probability of having a permanent contract
(21-24 months)
Probability of
having a
permanent
contract 21
months after
Probability of
having a
permanent
contract 22
months after
Probability of
having a
permanent
contract 23
months after
Probability of
having a
permanent
contract 24
months after
RD_Estimate -0.243 -0.412 -0.486 -0.616
(0.203) (0.358) (0.357) (0.395)
Observations 23559 23559 23559 23559
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: This table reports the regressions discontinuity estimates of the impact of UI benefits receipt.
The bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Linear specification. The
dependent variable corresponds to the probability of working under a permanent contract at different time
horizons after the end of the contract that defines the treatment status. The probability of having a
permanent contract is unconditional, in the sense that it is set to zero if the person is not employed.
Table A47: Impact of UI benefits receipt on
the probability of working in the same 2-digit
industry (1-4 months)
Probability of
being in the
same 2-digit
industry 1
months after
Probability of
being in the
same 2-digit
industry 2
months after
Probability of
being in the
same 2-digit
industry 3
months after
Probability of
being in the
same 2-digit
industry 4
months after
RD_Estimate -0.255 -0.500 -0.565 -0.729*
(0.379) (0.380) (0.378) (0.375)
Observations 23559 23559 23559 23559
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: This table reports the regressions discontinuity estimates of the impact of UI benefits receipt.
The bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Linear specification. The
dependent variable corresponds to the probability of working in the same 2-digit industry at different time
horizons after the end of the contract that defines the treatment status. The probability of working in the
same 2-digit industry is unconditional, in the sense that it is set to zero if the person is not employed.
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Table A48: Impact of UI benefits receipt on
the probability of working in the same 2-digit
industry (5-8 months)
Probability of
being in the
same 2-digit
industry 5
months after
Probability of
being in the
same 2-digit
industry 6
months after
Probability of
being in the
same 2-digit
industry 7
months after
Probability of
being in the
same 2-digit
industry 8
months after
RD_Estimate -0.727** -0.724** -0.418 -0.535
(0.352) (0.346) (0.337) (0.339)
Observations 23559 23559 23559 23559
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: This table reports the regressions discontinuity estimates of the impact of UI benefits receipt.
The bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Linear specification. The
dependent variable corresponds to the probability of working in the same 2-digit industry at different time
horizons after the end of the contract that defines the treatment status. The probability of working in the
same 2-digit industry is unconditional, in the sense that it is set to zero if the person is not employed.
Table A49: Impact of UI benefits receipt on
the probability of working in the same 2-digit
industry (9-12 months)
Probability of
being in the
same 2-digit
industry 9
months after
Probability of
being in the
same 2-digit
industry 10
months after
Probability of
being in the
same 2-digit
industry 11
months after
Probability of
being in the
same 2-digit
industry 12
months after
RD_Estimate -0.360 -0.247 0.040 0.108
(0.301) (0.309) (0.350) (0.361)
Observations 23559 23559 23559 23559
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: This table reports the regressions discontinuity estimates of the impact of UI benefits receipt.
The bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Linear specification. The
dependent variable corresponds to the probability of working in the same 2-digit industry at different time
horizons after the end of the contract that defines the treatment status. The probability of working in the
same 2-digit industry is unconditional, in the sense that it is set to zero if the person is not employed.
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Table A50: Impact of UI benefits receipt on
the probability of working in the same 2-digit
industry (13-16 months)
Probability of
being in the
same 2-digit
industry 13
months after
Probability of
being in the
same 2-digit
industry 14
months after
Probability of
being in the
same 2-digit
industry 15
months after
Probability of
being in the
same 2-digit
industry 16
months after
RD_Estimate -0.270 -0.117 -0.032 -0.070
(0.354) (0.358) (0.344) (0.347)
Observations 23559 23559 23559 23559
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: This table reports the regressions discontinuity estimates of the impact of UI benefits receipt.
The bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Linear specification. The
dependent variable corresponds to the probability of working in the same 2-digit industry at different time
horizons after the end of the contract that defines the treatment status. The probability of working in the
same 2-digit industry is unconditional, in the sense that it is set to zero if the person is not employed.
Table A51: Impact of UI benefits receipt on
the probability of working in the same 2-digit
industry (17-20 months)
Probability of
being in the
same 2-digit
industry 17
months after
Probability of
being in the
same 2-digit
industry 18
months after
Probability of
being in the
same 2-digit
industry 19
months after
Probability of
being in the
same 2-digit
industry 20
months after
RD_Estimate -0.078 -0.303 -0.525 -0.329
(0.345) (0.354) (0.347) (0.362)
Observations 23559 23559 23559 23559
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: This table reports the regressions discontinuity estimates of the impact of UI benefits receipt.
The bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Linear specification. The
dependent variable corresponds to the probability of working in the same 2-digit industry at different time
horizons after the end of the contract that defines the treatment status. The probability of working in the
same 2-digit industry is unconditional, in the sense that it is set to zero if the person is not employed.
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Table A52: Impact of UI benefits receipt on
the probability of working in the same 2-digit
industry (21-24 months)
Probability of
being in the
same 2-digit
industry 21
months after
Probability of
being in the
same 2-digit
industry 22
months after
Probability of
being in the
same 2-digit
industry 23
months after
Probability of
being in the
same 2-digit
industry 24
months after
RD_Estimate -0.552* 0.146 0.299 0.505
(0.335) (0.291) (0.405) (0.424)
Observations 23559 23559 23559 23559
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: This table reports the regressions discontinuity estimates of the impact of UI benefits receipt.
The bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Linear specification. The
dependent variable corresponds to the probability of working in the same 2-digit industry at different time
horizons after the end of the contract that defines the treatment status. The probability of working in the
same 2-digit industry is unconditional, in the sense that it is set to zero if the person is not employed.
Table A53: Impact of UI benefits receipt
on the probability of working full-time (1-4
months)
Probability of
having a
full-time job 1
months after
Probability of
having a
full-time job 2
months after
Probability of
having a
full-time job 3
months after
Probability of
having a
full-time job 4
months after
RD_Estimate -0.129 -0.016 0.027 -0.567
(0.384) (0.370) (0.377) (0.387)
Observations 23559 23559 23559 23559
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: This table reports the regressions discontinuity estimates of the impact of UI benefits receipt.
The bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Linear specification. The
dependent variable corresponds to the probability of working full-time at different time horizons after the
end of the contract that defines the treatment status. The probability of working full-time is unconditional,
in the sense that it is set to zero if the person is not employed.
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Table A54: Impact of UI benefits receipt
on the probability of working full-time (5-8
months)
Probability of
having a
full-time job 5
months after
Probability of
having a
full-time job 6
months after
Probability of
having a
full-time job 7
months after
Probability of
having a
full-time job 8
months after
RD_Estimate -0.541 -0.759* -0.728* -0.947**
(0.397) (0.409) (0.389) (0.383)
Observations 23559 23559 23559 23559
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: This table reports the regressions discontinuity estimates of the impact of UI benefits receipt.
The bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Linear specification. The
dependent variable corresponds to the probability of working full-time at different time horizons after the
end of the contract that defines the treatment status. The probability of working full-time is unconditional,
in the sense that it is set to zero if the person is not employed.
Table A55: Impact of UI benefits receipt
on the probability of working full-time (9-12
months)
Probability of
having a
full-time job 9
months after
Probability of
having a
full-time job 10
months after
Probability of
having a
full-time job 11
months after
Probability of
having a
full-time job 12
months after
RD_Estimate -0.355 -0.224 -0.279 -0.209
(0.376) (0.331) (0.328) (0.337)
Observations 23559 23559 23559 23559
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: This table reports the regressions discontinuity estimates of the impact of UI benefits receipt.
The bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Linear specification. The
dependent variable corresponds to the probability of working full-time at different time horizons after the
end of the contract that defines the treatment status. The probability of working full-time is unconditional,
in the sense that it is set to zero if the person is not employed.
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Table A56: Impact of UI benefits receipt on
the probability of working full-time (13-16
months)
Probability of
having a
full-time job 13
months after
Probability of
having a
full-time job 14
months after
Probability of
having a
full-time job 15
months after
Probability of
having a
full-time job 16
months after
RD_Estimate -0.083 -0.318 -0.517 -0.159
(0.354) (0.411) (0.426) (0.373)
Observations 23559 23559 23559 23559
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: This table reports the regressions discontinuity estimates of the impact of UI benefits receipt.
The bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Linear specification. The
dependent variable corresponds to the probability of working full-time at different time horizons after the
end of the contract that defines the treatment status. The probability of working full-time is unconditional,
in the sense that it is set to zero if the person is not employed.
Table A57: Impact of UI benefits receipt on
the probability of working full-time (17-20
months)
Probability of
having a
full-time job 17
months after
Probability of
having a
full-time job 18
months after
Probability of
having a
full-time job 19
months after
Probability of
having a
full-time job 20
months after
RD_Estimate -0.249 -0.453 -0.253 -0.312
(0.418) (0.434) (0.395) (0.274)
Observations 23559 23559 23559 23559
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: This table reports the regressions discontinuity estimates of the impact of UI benefits receipt.
The bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Linear specification. The
dependent variable corresponds to the probability of working full-time at different time horizons after the
end of the contract that defines the treatment status. The probability of working full-time is unconditional,
in the sense that it is set to zero if the person is not employed.
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Table A58: Impact of UI benefits receipt on
the probability of working full-time (21-24
months)
Probability of
having a
full-time job 21
months after
Probability of
having a
full-time job 22
months after
Probability of
having a
full-time job 23
months after
Probability of
having a
full-time job 24
months after
RD_Estimate -0.566 0.004 0.129 0.030
(0.402) (0.413) (0.393) (0.373)
Observations 23559 23559 23559 23559
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: This table reports the regressions discontinuity estimates of the impact of UI benefits receipt.
The bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Linear specification. The
dependent variable corresponds to the probability of working full-time at different time horizons after the
end of the contract that defines the treatment status. The probability of working full-time is unconditional,
in the sense that it is set to zero if the person is not employed.
Table A59: Impact of UI benefits receipt on
contract duration (1-4 months)
Duration of the
employment
spell 1 months
after
Duration of the
employment
spell 2 months
after
Duration of the
employment
spell 3 months
after
Duration of the
employment
spell 4 months
after
RD_Estimate -390.527 -504.597* -576.516* -672.300*
(351.933) (293.801) (336.191) (362.457)
Observations 23559 23559 23559 23559
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: This table reports the regressions discontinuity estimates of the impact of UI benefits receipt.
The bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Linear specification. The
dependent variable corresponds to the duration of the employment spell at different time horizons after the
end of the contract that defines the treatment status. The contract duration is unconditional, in the sense
that it is set to zero if the person is not employed.
97
Table A60: Impact of UI benefits receipt on
contract duration (5-8 months)
Duration of the
employment
spell 5 months
after
Duration of the
employment
spell 6 months
after
Duration of the
employment
spell 7 months
after
Duration of the
employment
spell 8 months
after
RD_Estimate -707.630* -821.084** -668.136* -876.174**
(366.177) (355.791) (359.051) (383.444)
Observations 23559 23559 23559 23559
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: This table reports the regressions discontinuity estimates of the impact of UI benefits receipt.
The bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Linear specification. The
dependent variable corresponds to the duration of the employment spell at different time horizons after the
end of the contract that defines the treatment status. The contract duration is unconditional, in the sense
that it is set to zero if the person is not employed.
Table A61: Impact of UI benefits receipt on
contract duration (9-12 months)
Duration of the
employment
spell 9 months
after
Duration of the
employment
spell 10 months
after
Duration of the
employment
spell 11 months
after
Duration of the
employment
spell 12 months
after
RD_Estimate -463.129 -746.594* -658.973* -634.606*
(305.095) (403.763) (388.678) (374.647)
Observations 23559 23559 23559 23559
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: This table reports the regressions discontinuity estimates of the impact of UI benefits receipt.
The bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Linear specification. The
dependent variable corresponds to the duration of the employment spell at different time horizons after the
end of the contract that defines the treatment status. The contract duration is unconditional, in the sense
that it is set to zero if the person is not employed.
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Table A62: Impact of UI benefits receipt on
contract duration (13-16 months)
Duration of the
employment
spell 13 months
after
Duration of the
employment
spell 14 months
after
Duration of the
employment
spell 15 months
after
Duration of the
employment
spell 16 months
after
RD_Estimate -609.118 -618.413* -732.174* -786.672**
(395.255) (375.210) (378.387) (383.681)
Observations 23559 23559 23559 23559
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: This table reports the regressions discontinuity estimates of the impact of UI benefits receipt.
The bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Linear specification. The
dependent variable corresponds to the duration of the employment spell at different time horizons after the
end of the contract that defines the treatment status. The contract duration is unconditional, in the sense
that it is set to zero if the person is not employed.
Table A63: Impact of UI benefits receipt on
contract duration (17-20 months)
Duration of the
employment
spell 17 months
after
Duration of the
employment
spell 18 months
after
Duration of the
employment
spell 19 months
after
Duration of the
employment
spell 20 months
after
RD_Estimate -731.153* -733.036* -745.598** -839.462**
(380.131) (379.900) (370.343) (392.360)
Observations 23559 23559 23559 23559
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: This table reports the regressions discontinuity estimates of the impact of UI benefits receipt.
The bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Linear specification. The
dependent variable corresponds to the duration of the employment spell at different time horizons after the
end of the contract that defines the treatment status. The contract duration is unconditional, in the sense
that it is set to zero if the person is not employed.
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Table A64: Impact of UI benefits receipt on
contract duration (21-24 months)
Duration of the
employment
spell 21 months
after
Duration of the
employment
spell 22 months
after
Duration of the
employment
spell 23 months
after
Duration of the
employment
spell 24 months
after
RD_Estimate -830.318** -342.242 -347.639 -375.121
(359.420) (351.752) (372.287) (359.088)
Observations 23559 23559 23559 23559
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: This table reports the regressions discontinuity estimates of the impact of UI benefits receipt.
The bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Linear specification. The
dependent variable corresponds to the duration of the employment spell at different time horizons after the
end of the contract that defines the treatment status. The contract duration is unconditional, in the sense
that it is set to zero if the person is not employed.
Table A65: Bounds on the treatment effect
on the probability of having a permanent
contract (1-4 months)
Probability to
have a
permanent
contract 1
months after
Probability to
have a
permanent
contract 2
months after
Probability to
have a
permanent
contract 3
months after
Probability to
have a
permanent
contract 4
months after
lower -0.018 -0.001 -0.028 -0.053**
(0.026) (0.024) (0.023) (0.022)
upper 0.159*** 0.113*** 0.068* 0.126***
(0.042) (0.037) (0.035) (0.035)
Effect ci lower bound -0.0610 -0.0402 -0.0659 -0.0900
Effect ci upper bound 0.2283 0.1746 0.1267 0.1838
Observations 4104 3913 3639 4150
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: The bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Linear specification.
The dependent variable corresponds to the probability of working under a permanent contract at different
time horizons after the end of the contract that defines the treatment status. The method developed by Lee
(2009) allows to derive bounds on the treatment effect taking into account the selection into employment.
The implementation has been done using the package "leebounds" developed by Tauchmann (2013) on Stata.
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Table A66: Bounds on the treatment effect
on the probability of having a permanent
contract (5-8 months)
Probability to
have a
permanent
contract 5
months after
Probability to
have a
permanent
contract 6
months after
Probability to
have a
permanent
contract 7
months after
Probability to
have a
permanent
contract 8
months after
lower -0.052** -0.047* -0.045* -0.064**
(0.023) (0.025) (0.026) (0.028)
upper 0.161*** 0.198*** 0.196*** 0.194***
(0.035) (0.037) (0.038) (0.040)
Effect ci lower bound -0.0899 -0.0882 -0.0878 -0.1106
Effect ci upper bound 0.2187 0.2594 0.2576 0.2588
Observations 4384 4443 4443 4332
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: The bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Linear specification.
The dependent variable corresponds to the probability of working under a permanent contract at different
time horizons after the end of the contract that defines the treatment status. The method developed by Lee
(2009) allows to derive bounds on the treatment effect taking into account the selection into employment.
The implementation has been done using the package "leebounds" developed by Tauchmann (2013) on Stata.
Table A67: Bounds on the treatment effect
on the probability of having a permanent
contract (9-12 months)
Probability to
have a
permanent
contract 9
months after
Probability to
have a
permanent
contract 10
months after
Probability to
have a
permanent
contract 11
months after
Probability to
have a
permanent
contract 12
months after
lower 0.004 -0.049* -0.047* -0.044
(0.024) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027)
upper 0.052 -0.017 0.015 0.027
(0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.033)
Effect ci lower bound -0.0357 -0.0932 -0.0889 -0.0891
Effect ci upper bound 0.1050 0.0345 0.0657 0.0813
Observations 4739 4150 4150 3639
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: The bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Linear specification.
The dependent variable corresponds to the probability of working under a permanent contract at different
time horizons after the end of the contract that defines the treatment status. The method developed by Lee
(2009) allows to derive bounds on the treatment effect taking into account the selection into employment.
The implementation has been done using the package "leebounds" developed by Tauchmann (2013) on Stata.
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Table A68: Bounds on the treatment effect
on the probability of having a permanent
contract (13-16 months)
Probability to
have a
permanent
contract 13
months after
Probability to
have a
permanent
contract 14
months after
Probability to
have a
permanent
contract 15
months after
Probability to
have a
permanent
contract 16
months after
lower -0.045 -0.039 -0.059** -0.058**
(0.029) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023)
upper 0.038 0.038 0.016 0.042
(0.035) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028)
Effect ci lower bound -0.0928 -0.0772 -0.0982 -0.0946
Effect ci upper bound 0.0966 0.0854 0.0624 0.0877
Observations 3102 4332 4150 4332
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: The bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Linear specification.
The dependent variable corresponds to the probability of working under a permanent contract at different
time horizons after the end of the contract that defines the treatment status. The method developed by Lee
(2009) allows to derive bounds on the treatment effect taking into account the selection into employment.
The implementation has been done using the package "leebounds" developed by Tauchmann (2013) on Stata.
Table A69: Bounds on the treatment effect
on the probabilityof having a permanent con-
tract (17-20 months)
Probability to
have a
permanent
contract 17
months after
Probability to
have a
permanent
contract 18
months after
Probability to
have a
permanent
contract 19
months after
Probability to
have a
permanent
contract 20
months after
lower -0.033 -0.032 -0.032 -0.065**
(0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.026)
upper 0.094*** 0.119*** 0.122*** 0.125***
(0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030)
Effect ci lower bound -0.0714 -0.0721 -0.0714 -0.1073
Effect ci upper bound 0.1414 0.1676 0.1692 0.1747
Observations 4332 4443 4869 4739
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: The bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Linear specification.
The dependent variable corresponds to the probability of working under a permanent contract at different
time horizons after the end of the contract that defines the treatment status. The method developed by Lee
(2009) allows to derive bounds on the treatment effect taking into account the selection into employment.
The implementation has been done using the package "leebounds" developed by Tauchmann (2013) on Stata.
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Table A70: Bounds on the treatment effect
on the probability of having a permanent
contract (21-24 months)
Probability to
have a
permanent
contract 21
months after
Probability to
have a
permanent
contract 22
months after
Probability to
have a
permanent
contract 23
months after
Probability to
have a
permanent
contract 24
months after
lower -0.030 -0.071*** -0.052* -0.054*
(0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028)
upper 0.081*** -0.012 -0.039 -0.048*
(0.030) (0.025) (0.026) (0.029)
Effect ci lower bound -0.0743 -0.1149 -0.1014 -0.1067
Effect ci upper bound 0.1308 0.0298 0.0061 0.0057
Observations 4332 4629 3959 3276
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: The bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Linear specification.
The dependent variable corresponds to the probability of working under a permanent contract at different
time horizons after the end of the contract that defines the treatment status. The method developed by Lee
(2009) allows to derive bounds on the treatment effect taking into account the selection into employment.
The implementation has been done using the package "leebounds" developed by Tauchmann (2013) on Stata.
Table A71: Bounds on the treatment effect
on the probability of working in the same 2-
digit industry (1-4 months)
Probability of
being in the
same 2-digit
industry 1
month after
Probability of
being in the
same 2-digit
industry 2
months after
Probability of
being in the
same 2-digit
industry 3
months after
Probability of
being in the
same 2-digit
industry 4
months after
lower -0.088*** -0.090*** -0.082*** -0.096***
(0.031) (0.029) (0.027) (0.027)
upper 0.059* 0.018 0.003 0.058*
(0.035) (0.031) (0.030) (0.031)
Effect ci lower bound -0.1395 -0.1378 -0.1264 -0.1397
Effect ci upper bound 0.1169 0.0700 0.0527 0.1088
Observations 5054 4927 4693 5054
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: The bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Linear specification.
The dependent variable corresponds to the probability of working in the same 2-digit industry at different
time horizons after the end of the contract that defines the treatment status. The method developed by Lee
(2009) allows to derive bounds on the treatment effect taking into account the selection into employment.
The implementation has been done using the package "leebounds" developed by Tauchmann (2013) on Stata.
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Table A72: Bounds on the treatment effect
on the probability of working in the same 2-
digit industry (5-8 months)
Probability of
being in the
same 2-digit
industry 5
months after
Probability of
being in the
same 2-digit
industry 6
months after
Probability of
being in the
same 2-digit
industry 7
months after
Probability of
being in the
same 2-digit
industry 8
months after
lower -0.112*** -0.138*** -0.138*** -0.118***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029)
upper 0.078** 0.080** 0.072** 0.101***
(0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.036)
Effect ci lower bound -0.1577 -0.1845 -0.1847 -0.1652
Effect ci upper bound 0.1320 0.1344 0.1285 0.1603
Observations 4869 5227 5054 4927
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: The bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Linear specification.
The dependent variable corresponds to theprobability of working in the same 2-digit industry at different
time horizons after the end of the contract that defines the treatment status. The method developed by Lee
(2009) allows to derive bounds on the treatment effect taking into account the selection into employment.
The implementation has been done using the package "leebounds" developed by Tauchmann (2013) on Stata.
Table A73: Bounds on the treatment effect
on the probability of working in the same 2-
digit industry (9-12 months)
Probability of
being in the
same 2-digit
industry 9
months after
Probability of
being in the
same 2-digit
industry 10
months after
Probability of
being in the
same 2-digit
industry 11
months after
Probability of
being in the
same 2-digit
industry 12
months after
lower -0.000 0.003 0.017 -0.002
(0.024) (0.028) (0.029) (0.031)
upper 0.003 0.012 0.020 0.019
(0.030) (0.033) (0.025) (0.036)
Effect ci lower bound -0.0463 -0.0478 -0.0389 -0.0554
Effect ci upper bound 0.0604 0.0740 0.0677 0.0827
Observations 5227 3913 4693 3189
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: The bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Linear specification.
The dependent variable corresponds to the probability of working in the same 2-digit industry at different
time horizons after the end of the contract that defines the treatment status. The method developed by Lee
(2009) allows to derive bounds on the treatment effect taking into account the selection into employment.
The implementation has been done using the package "leebounds" developed by Tauchmann (2013) on Stata.
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Table A74: Bounds on the treatment effect
on the probability of working in the same 2-
digit industry (13-16 months)
Probability of
being in the
same 2-digit
industry 13
months after
Probability of
being in the
same 2-digit
industry 14
months after
Probability of
being in the
same 2-digit
industry 15
months after
Probability of
being in the
same 2-digit
industry 16
months after
lower -0.042* -0.030 -0.019 -0.025
(0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025)
upper 0.001 0.010 0.010 0.022
(0.029) (0.029) (0.032) (0.030)
Effect ci lower bound -0.0832 -0.0708 -0.0640 -0.0669
Effect ci upper bound 0.0484 0.0580 0.0638 0.0718
Observations 4693 4384 3639 3835
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: The bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Linear specification.
The dependent variable corresponds to the probability of working in the same 2-digit industry at different
time horizons after the end of the contract that defines the treatment status. The method developed by Lee
(2009) allows to derive bounds on the treatment effect taking into account the selection into employment.
The implementation has been done using the package "leebounds" developed by Tauchmann (2013) on Stata.
Table A75: Bounds on the treatment effect
on the probability of working in the same 2-
digit industry (17-20 months)
Probability of
being in the
same 2-digit
industry 17
months after
Probability of
being in the
same 2-digit
industry 18
months after
Probability of
being in the
same 2-digit
industry 19
months after
Probability of
being in the
same 2-digit
industry 20
months after
lower -0.028 -0.048* -0.067*** -0.071***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.027)
upper 0.056* 0.075** 0.065** 0.082**
(0.031) (0.032) (0.030) (0.034)
Effect ci lower bound -0.0699 -0.0914 -0.1071 -0.1156
Effect ci upper bound 0.1073 0.1269 0.1142 0.1384
Observations 3959 4150 4869 4104
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: The bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Linear specification.
The dependent variable corresponds to the probability of working in the same 2-digit industry at different
time horizons after the end of the contract that defines the treatment status. The method developed by Lee
(2009) allows to derive bounds on the treatment effect taking into account the selection into employment.
The implementation has been done using the package "leebounds" developed by Tauchmann (2013) on Stata.
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Table A76: Bounds on the treatment effect
on the probability of working in the same 2-
digit industry (21-24 months)
Probability of
being in the
same 2-digit
industry 21
months after
Probability of
being in the
same 2-digit
industry 22
months after
Probability of
being in the
same 2-digit
industry 23
months after
Probability of
being in the
same 2-digit
industry 24
months after
lower -0.021 -0.016 -0.015 0.006
(0.024) (0.032) (0.031) (0.037)
upper 0.032 0.050* 0.024 0.028
(0.030) (0.027) (0.025) (0.031)
Effect ci lower bound -0.0607 -0.0687 -0.0659 -0.0579
Effect ci upper bound 0.0821 0.0938 0.0655 0.0817
Observations 4629 3835 3913 2615
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: The bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Linear specification.
The dependent variable corresponds to the probability of working in the same 2-digit industry at different
time horizons after the end of the contract that defines the treatment status. The method developed by Lee
(2009) allows to derive bounds on the treatment effect taking into account the selection into employment.
The implementation has been done using the package "leebounds" developed by Tauchmann (2013) on Stata.
Table A77: Bounds on the treatment effect
on the probability of working full-time (1-4
months)
Probability to
work full-time 1
month after
Probability to
work full-time 2
months after
Probability to
work full-time 3
months after
Probability to
work full-time 4
months after
lower -0.038 -0.008 0.000 -0.082**
(0.037) (0.043) (0.038) (0.036)
upper 0.142*** 0.069* 0.094*** 0.098***
(0.038) (0.040) (0.034) (0.032)
Effect ci lower bound -0.0989 -0.0780 -0.0621 -0.1405
Effect ci upper bound 0.2049 0.1348 0.1507 0.1514
Observations 3639 2253 2665 3276
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: The bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Linear specification.
The dependent variable corresponds to the probability of working full-time at different time horizons after the
end of the contract that defines the treatment status. The method developed by Lee (2009) allows to derive
bounds on the treatment effect taking into account the selection into employment. The implementation has
been done using the package "leebounds" developed by Tauchmann (2013) on Stata.
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Table A78: Bounds on the treatment effect
on the probability of working full-time (5-8
months)
Probability to
work full-time 5
months after
Probability to
work full-time 6
months after
Probability to
work full-time 7
months after
Probability to
work full-time 8
months after
lower -0.085** -0.120*** -0.120*** -0.135***
(0.038) (0.034) (0.033) (0.036)
upper 0.110*** 0.125*** 0.123*** 0.123***
(0.034) (0.031) (0.029) (0.032)
Effect ci lower bound -0.1475 -0.1759 -0.1733 -0.1952
Effect ci upper bound 0.1658 0.1757 0.1716 0.1760
Observations 3102 4332 4869 4332
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: The bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Linear specification.
The dependent variable corresponds to theprobability of working full-time at different time horizons after the
end of the contract that defines the treatment status. The method developed by Lee (2009) allows to derive
bounds on the treatment effect taking into account the selection into employment. The implementation has
been done using the package "leebounds" developed by Tauchmann (2013) on Stata.
Table A79: Bounds on the treatment effect
on the probability of working full-time (9-12
months)
Probability to
work full-time 9
months after
Probability to
work full-time
10 months after
Probability to
work full-time
11 months after
Probability to
work full-time
12 months after
lower -0.005 0.028 0.027 0.009
(0.031) (0.029) (0.023) (0.027)
upper 0.043 0.041 0.031 0.048**
(0.027) (0.025) (0.020) (0.024)
Effect ci lower bound -0.0560 -0.0239 -0.0152 -0.0366
Effect ci upper bound 0.0877 0.0861 0.0686 0.0879
Observations 4629 4499 6833 4739
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: The bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Linear specification.
The dependent variable corresponds to the probability of working full-time at different time horizons after the
end of the contract that defines the treatment status. The method developed by Lee (2009) allows to derive
bounds on the treatment effect taking into account the selection into employment. The implementation has
been done using the package "leebounds" developed by Tauchmann (2013) on Stata.
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Table A80: Bounds on the treatment effect
on the probability of working full-time (13-16
months)
Probability to
work full-time
13 months after
Probability to
work full-time
14 months after
Probability to
work full-time
15 months after
Probability to
work full-time
16 months after
lower 0.004 0.003 -0.011 -0.016
(0.026) (0.022) (0.028) (0.021)
upper 0.066*** 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.080***
(0.023) (0.020) (0.024) (0.018)
Effect ci lower bound -0.0387 -0.0335 -0.0572 -0.0504
Effect ci upper bound 0.1035 0.0974 0.1052 0.1103
Observations 5054 6521 4104 6923
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: The bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Linear specification.
The dependent variable corresponds to the probability of working full-time at different time horizons after the
end of the contract that defines the treatment status. The method developed by Lee (2009) allows to derive
bounds on the treatment effect taking into account the selection into employment. The implementation has
been done using the package "leebounds" developed by Tauchmann (2013) on Stata.
Table A81: Bounds on the treatment effect
on the probability of working full-time (17-20
months)
Probability to
work full-time
17 months after
Probability to
work full-time
18 months after
Probability to
work full-time
19 months after
Probability to
work full-time
20 months after
lower -0.046** -0.063** -0.063*** -0.074***
(0.022) (0.026) (0.025) (0.024)
upper 0.080*** 0.086*** 0.098*** 0.119***
(0.019) (0.022) (0.021) (0.020)
Effect ci lower bound -0.0829 -0.1060 -0.1036 -0.1138
Effect ci upper bound 0.1108 0.1221 0.1320 0.1521
Observations 6765 5442 6421 7329
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: The bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Linear specification.
The dependent variable corresponds to the probability of working full-time at different time horizons after the
end of the contract that defines the treatment status. The method developed by Lee (2009) allows to derive
bounds on the treatment effect taking into account the selection into employment. The implementation has
been done using the package "leebounds" developed by Tauchmann (2013) on Stata.
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Table A82: Bounds on the treatment effect
on the probability of working full-time (21-24
months)
Probability to
work full-time
21 months after
Probability to
work full-time
22 months after
Probability to
work full-time
23 months after
Probability to
work full-time
24 months after
lower -0.030 -0.013 0.019 0.008
(0.023) (0.022) (0.027) (0.025)
upper 0.061*** 0.050* 0.033 0.013
(0.019) (0.027) (0.032) (0.021)
Effect ci lower bound -0.0678 -0.0497 -0.0285 -0.0392
Effect ci upper bound 0.0928 0.0948 0.0908 0.0527
Observations 7197 5014 3189 4693
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: The bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Linear specification.
The dependent variable corresponds to the probability of working full-time at different time horizons after the
end of the contract that defines the treatment status. The method developed by Lee (2009) allows to derive
bounds on the treatment effect taking into account the selection into employment. The implementation has
been done using the package "leebounds" developed by Tauchmann (2013) on Stata.
Table A83: Bounds on the treatment effect
on contract duration (1-4 months)
Duration of the
employment
spell 1 months
after
Duration of the
employment
spell 2 months
after
Duration of the
employment
spell 3 months
after
Duration of the
employment
spell 4 months
after
lower -89.458*** -75.050*** -91.003*** -103.098***
(30.005) (26.080) (31.850) (25.164)
upper 162.700*** 104.299*** 55.467 138.637***
(28.829) (38.229) (50.010) (24.803)
Effect ci lower bound -138.8119 -117.9474 -143.3921 -144.4899
Effect ci upper bound 210.1185 167.1804 137.7273 179.4340
Observations 3959 4150 2442 3959
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: The bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Linear specification.
The dependent variable corresponds to the duration of the employment spell at different time horizons after
the end of the contract that defines the treatment status. The method developed by Lee (2009) allows to
derive bounds on the treatment effect taking into account the selection into employment. The implementation
has been done using the package "leebounds" developed by Tauchmann (2013) on Stata.
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Table A84: Bounds on the treatment effect
on contract duration (5-8 months)
Duration of the
employment
spell 5 months
after
Duration of the
employment
spell 6 months
after
Duration of the
employment
spell 7 months
after
Duration of the
employment
spell 8 months
after
lower -83.174*** -89.186*** -98.983*** -112.802***
(24.848) (26.193) (28.496) (30.591)
upper 184.910*** 209.690*** 205.383*** 215.224***
(22.579) (23.212) (26.525) (28.095)
Effect ci lower bound -124.0459 -132.2693 -145.8545 -163.1204
Effect ci upper bound 222.0498 247.8710 249.0132 261.4365
Observations 4384 4499 4150 4150
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: The bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Linear specification.
The dependent variable corresponds to the duration of the employment spell at different time horizons after
the end of the contract that defines the treatment status. The method developed by Lee (2009) allows to
derive bounds on the treatment effect taking into account the selection into employment. The implementation
has been done using the package "leebounds" developed by Tauchmann (2013) on Stata.
Table A85: Bounds on the treatment effect
on contract duration (9-12 months)
Duration of the
employment
spell 9 months
after
Duration of the
employment
spell 10 months
after
Duration of the
employment
spell 11 months
after
Duration of the
employment
spell 12 months
after
lower -9.781 -85.947** -85.320*** -69.013**
(27.884) (38.153) (33.072) (28.244)
upper 84.087** 68.302 68.487* 46.002
(37.421) (46.045) (39.703) (34.663)
Effect ci lower bound -55.6459 -148.7036 -139.7188 -115.4708
Effect ci upper bound 145.6388 144.0382 133.7918 103.0172
Observations 4869 2567 3102 3835
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: The bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Linear specification.
The dependent variable corresponds to the duration of the employment spell at different time horizons after
the end of the contract that defines the treatment status. The method developed by Lee (2009) allows to
derive bounds on the treatment effect taking into account the selection into employment. The implementation
has been done using the package "leebounds" developed by Tauchmann (2013) on Stata.
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Table A86: Bounds on the treatment effect
on contract duration (13-16 months)
Duration of the
employment
spell 13 months
after
Duration of the
employment
spell 14 months
after
Duration of the
employment
spell 15 months
after
Duration of the
employment
spell 16 months
after
lower -74.305*** -67.056*** -78.091*** -79.384***
(26.415) (25.145) (25.091) (24.245)
upper 54.469 65.758** 49.305 75.626***
(33.193) (31.019) (31.098) (28.424)
Effect ci lower bound -117.7535 -108.4169 -119.3618 -119.2634
Effect ci upper bound 109.0664 116.7791 100.4571 122.3803
Observations 3913 4057 3835 3959
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: The bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Linear specification.
The dependent variable corresponds to the duration of the employment spell at different time horizons after
the end of the contract that defines the treatment status. The method developed by Lee (2009) allows to
derive bounds on the treatment effect taking into account the selection into employment. The implementation
has been done using the package "leebounds" developed by Tauchmann (2013) on Stata.
Table A87: Bounds on the treatment effect
on contract duration (17-20 months)
Duration of the
employment
spell 17 months
after
Duration of the
employment
spell 18 months
after
Duration of the
employment
spell 19 months
after
Duration of the
employment
spell 20 months
after
lower -71.239*** -73.267*** -84.344*** -89.722***
(23.405) (24.636) (25.884) (26.183)
upper 109.733*** 133.107*** 125.101*** 156.466***
(25.886) (25.590) (26.532) (26.705)
Effect ci lower bound -109.7366 -113.7895 -126.9184 -132.7897
Effect ci upper bound 152.3111 175.1985 168.7424 200.3920
Observations 4332 4195 4104 4384
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: The bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Linear specification.
The dependent variable corresponds to the duration of the employment spell at different time horizons after
the end of the contract that defines the treatment status. The method developed by Lee (2009) allows to
derive bounds on the treatment effect taking into account the selection into employment. The implementation
has been done using the package "leebounds" developed by Tauchmann (2013) on Stata.
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Table A88: Bounds on the treatment effect
on contract duration (21-24 months)
Duration of the
employment
spell 21 months
after
Duration of the
employment
spell 22 months
after
Duration of the
employment
spell 23 months
after
Duration of the
employment
spell 24 months
after
lower -71.541** -94.057*** -62.264* -39.740
(28.791) (34.426) (31.821) (25.143)
upper 105.512*** -27.733 -37.908 -18.249
(30.310) (29.994) (25.357) (56.198)
Effect ci lower bound -118.8980 -150.7517 -116.7682 -85.0931
Effect ci upper bound 155.3676 21.6636 5.5259 83.1241
Observations 4104 3189 3959 4104
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: The bandwidth has been computed using the MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Linear specification.
The dependent variable corresponds to the duration of the employment spell at different time horizons after
the end of the contract that defines the treatment status. The method developed by Lee (2009) allows to
derive bounds on the treatment effect taking into account the selection into employment. The implementation
has been done using the package "leebounds" developed by Tauchmann (2013) on Stata.
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Table A89: Impact of UI benefit receipt on
the number of employment spells over the
following two years
Number of employment spells over the following 2 years
Linear Quadratic Cubic
RD_Estimate -9.795** -9.298* -9.336
(4.076) (5.059) (6.296)
Observations 23559 23559 23559
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: This table reports the regressions discontinuity estimates of the im-
pact of UI benefits receipt. The bandwidth has been computed using the
MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Linear, quadratic and cubic specifications.
The dependent variable corresponds to the number of employment spells over
the two years following the end of the contract that defines the treatment
status.
Table A90: Impact of UI benefit receipt on
the number of unemployment spells over the
following two years
Number of unemployment spells over the following 2 years
Linear Quadratic Cubic
RD_Estimate 0.957 0.604 0.120
(1.038) (1.556) (2.213)
Observations 23559 23559 23559
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: This table reports the regressions discontinuity estimates of the im-
pact of UI benefits receipt. The bandwidth has been computed using the
MSE optimal bandwidth selector. Linear, quadratic and cubic specifications.
The dependent variable corresponds to the number of unemployment spells
over the two years following the end of the contract that defines the treatment
status.
113
Table A91: Impact of UI benefit receipt on
the total number of days employed over the
following two years
Total number of days employed over the following 2 years
Linear Quadratic Cubic
RD_Estimate -1027.132* -737.503 -1084.775
(566.452) (739.947) (837.905)
Observations 23559 23559 23559
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors in parentheses.
NOTE: This table reports the regressions discontinuity estimates of the im-
pact of UI benefits receipt. The bandwidth has been computed using the MSE
optimal bandwidth selector. Linear, quadratic and cubic specifications. The
dependent variable corresponds to the total number of days employed over
the two years following the end of the contract that defines the treatment
status.
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